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Abstract—With the exponential growth of cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPS), new security challenges have emerged. Various vul-
nerabilities, threats, attacks, and controls have been introduced
for the new generation of CPS. However, there lack a systematic
study of CPS security issues. In particular, the heterogeneity of
CPS components and the diversity of CPS systems have made it
very difficult to study the problem with one generalized model.
In this paper, we capture and systematize existing research on
CPS security under a unified framework. The framework consists
of three orthogonal coordinates: (1) from the security perspective,
we follow the well-known taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities,
attacks and controls; (2)from the CPS components perspective,
we focus on cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components;
and (3) from the CPS systems perspective, we explore general
CPS features as well as representative systems (e.g., smart grids,
medical CPS and smart cars). The model can be both abstract
to show general interactions of a CPS application and specific
to capture any details when needed. By doing so, we aim to
build a model that is abstract enough to be applicable to various
heterogeneous CPS applications; and to gain a modular view of
the tightly coupled CPS components. Such abstract decoupling
makes it possible to gain a systematic understanding of CPS
security, and to highlight the potential sources of attacks and
ways of protection.
Index Terms—CPS, ICS, Smart Grids, Smart Cars, Medical
Devices, Security, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, Threats, Controls
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, we have witnessed an exponential growthin the development and deployment of various types of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). They have brought impacts to
almost all aspects of our daily life, for instance, in electrical
power grids, oil and natural gas distribution, transportation
systems, health-care devices, household appliances, and many
more. Many of such systems are deployed in the critical
infrastructure, life support devices, or are essential to our daily
lives. Therefore, they are expected to be free of vulnerabilities
and immune to all types of attacks, which, unfortunately, is
practically impossible for all real-world systems.
One fundamental issue in CPS security is the heterogeneity
of the building blocks. CPS are composed of various compo-
nents in many ways. There are different hardware components
such as sensors, actuators, and embedded systems. There are
also different collections of software products, proprietary and
commercial, for control and monitoring. As a result, every
component, as well as their integration, can be a contributing
factor to a CPS attack. Understanding the current CPS security
vulnerabilities, attacks and protection mechanisms will provide
us with a better understanding of the security posture of CPS.
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Consequently, we should be able point out the limitations of
CPS that make them subject to different attacks and devise
approaches to defend against them.
The complexity of cyber physical systems and the het-
erogeneity of CPS components have introduced significant
difficulties to security and privacy protection of CPS. In par-
ticular, with the complex cyber-physical interactions, threats
and vulnerabilities becomes difficult to asses, and new security
issues arise. It is also difficult to identify, trace and examine
the attacks, which may originate from, move between, and
target at multiple CPS components. An in-depth understanding
of the vulnerabilities, threats and attacks is essential to the
development of defense mechanisms. A survey of existing CPS
security and privacy controls will also enable us to identify
missing pieces, weak links and new explorations.
In this survey, we first briefly introduce CPS, with a special
focus on how they are different from either legacy control
systems or traditional IT systems. Recognizing the difference
is key in understanding CPS security problems. We then survey
the literature on CPS privacy and security under a unified
framework, which consists of three orthogonal coordinates,
as shown in Figure 1. First, from security perspective, we
follow the well-known taxonomy of threats (Section III),
vulnerabilities (Section IV), attacks (Section V) and controls
(Section VI). Next, we discuss each main aspect following
the CPS components perspective: cyber, physical, and cyber-
physical. For instance, when we survey the attacks, we cat-
egorize them into cyber-attacks, physical-attacks, and cyber-
physical-attacks. Last, from the CPS systems perspective, we
explore general CPS features as well as representative systems,
in particular, industrial control systems, smart grids, medical
CPS, and smart cars. At the end of Section VI, we summarize
the key threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls in each
CPS aspect for each representative CPS system. In this survey,
we not only systematizes existing knowledge and provide
insightful perspectives on CPS security, but also identify open
areas that need more attention, and highlight the unanswered
challenges (Section VII).
In this work, our contributions are as follows: (1) We
propose a CPS security framework that aims to distinguish
between cyber, cyber-physical, and physical components in
a given system. (2) We survey potential threat sources and
their motivations. (3) We present the existing vulnerabilities
and highlight the root reasons with actual examples. (4) We
survey reported attacks on CPS and pinpoint the underlying
vulnerabilities and subtly influenced CPS components. (5)
We also summarize existing control mechanisms, and further
identify the unsolved issues and challenges in different CPS
applications.
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Fig. 1. CPS security framework with three orthogonal coordinates: security,
CPS components, and representative CPS systems.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cyber-Physical Systems
While there doesn’t exist a unanimously accepted, author-
itative definition of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we can
simply say that CPS are systems used to monitor and control
the physical world. They are perceived as the new generation
of embedded control systems such that CPS are networked
embedded systems. In addition, systems, where sensor and
actuator networks are embedded, are also considered CPS [13].
Because of the reliance on IT systems, CPS could be defined
as IT systems that are integrated into physical world applica-
tion [52]. This integration is a result of the advancements in the
information and communication technologies (ICT) to enhance
interactions with physical processes. All of these definitions
highlight the heavy presence of the interactions between the
cyber and the physical worlds.
An increasing dependence on CPS is growing in various
applications such as energy, transportation, military, health-
care, and manufacturing. CPS can be called different names,
depending on the application using them. For example, a very
important and representative CPS is the Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, which is used in
Critical Infrastructure (CI) such as the Smart Grid and In-
dustrial Control Systems (ICS). Other examples have emerged
in medical devices such as wearable and implantable medical
devices. In addition, a network of small control systems are
embedded in modern cars to improve fuel efficiency, safety,
and convenience. Here we introduce briefly four representative
applications of CPS that we will cover throughout the paper.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). ICS refers to control sys-
tems used to enhance the control, monitoring, and production
in different industries such as the nuclear plants, water and
sewage systems, and irrigation systems. Sometimes ICS is
called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
or Distributed Control Systems (DCS). For consistency, we
will use the term ICS hereafter. In ICS, different controllers
with different capabilities collaborate to achieve numerous
expected goals. A popular controller is the Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC), which is a microprocessor designed
to operate continuously in hostile environments [86]. This field
device is connected to the physical world through sensors
and actuators. Usually, it is equipped with wireless and wired
communication capacity that is configured depending on the
surrounding environments. It can also be connected to PC
systems in a control center that monitors and controls the
operations.
Smart Grid Systems. The smart grid is envisioned as the
next generation of the power grid that has been used for
decades for electricity generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion. The smart grid provides several benefits and advanced
functionalities. At the national level, it provides enhanced
emission control, global load balancing, smart generation, and
energy savings. Whereas at the local level, it allows home
consumers better control over their energy use that would be
beneficial economically and environmentally [102]. The smart
grid is comprised of two major components: power application
and supporting infrastructure [145]. The power application is
where the core functions of the smart grid are provided, i.e.,
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. Whereas
the supporting infrastructure is the intelligent component that
is mainly concerned with controlling and monitoring the core
operations of the smart grid using a set of software, hardware,
and communication networks.
Medical Devices. Medical devices have been improved by
integrating cyber and physical capabilities to deliver better
health care services. We are more interested in medical devices
with cyber capabilities that have physical impact on patients.
Such devices are either implanted inside the patient’s body,
called Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), or worn by
patients, called wearable devices. They are usually equipped
with wireless capabilities to allow communication with other
devices such as the programmer, which is needed for updating
and reconfiguring the devices. Wearable devices communicate
with each other or with other devices, such as a remote
physician or smartphone [134].
Smart Cars. Smart cars (intelligent cars) are cars that are
more environment-friendly, fuel-efficient, safe, and have en-
hanced entertainment and convenience features. These ad-
vancements are made possible by the reliance on a range
of 50 to 70 computers networked together, called Electronic
Control Units (ECUs). ECUs are responsible for monitoring
and controlling various functions such as engine emission con-
trol, brake control, entertainment (radio, multimedia players)
and comfort features (cruise control and windows opening and
closing).
B. CPS Communications
Communication technologies vary in CPS applications. Dif-
ferent application use different protocols, open and proprietary,
and technologies, wired and wireless. Here we give a brief
overview of the most common communication technologies
and protocols in each of the four applications.
ICS. Two categories of communication protocols are deployed
in ICS, one is used for the automation and control such
as Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), and the
other is for interconnecting ICS control centers, such as Inter-
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Control Center Protocol (ICCP) [1]. Those protocols are used
in addition to general-purpose protocols such as TCP/IP.
Smart Grid. The networks are of two types: field device
communications within substations using Modbus and DNP3,
and recently the more advanced protocol, developed by the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), IEC 61850.
The other type is control center communications, which also
rely on ICCP, similar to ICS. In addition, smart meters and
field devices use wireless communications to send measure-
ments and receive commands from control centers. Smart
meters, for example, use short-range frequency signals, e.g.,
Zigbee, for diagnostics operations by technicians or readings
by digital smart readers.
Medical Devices. It is a necessary requirement that IMDs
be configured and updated wirelessly, so that no surgical
extraction for the device is needed. Therefore, wireless com-
munication is the most common method of communication in
medical devices. IMDs and wearable devices rely on differ-
ent communication protocols and technologies. For example,
IMDs use low frequency (LF) signals specified by The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), called Medical Implant
Communication Service (MICS), that make it possible for
IMDs and their programmers to communicate. On the other
hand, wearable devices rely on another type of wireless com-
munications, i.e., Body Area Network (BAN). BAN utilizes
a number of wireless communication technologies such as
Bluetooth and ZigBee [21].
Smart Cars. Smart cars can have different types of communi-
cation capacities, including Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2I), and in-vehicle communications. In
this paper we focus on the latter. As we mentioned, cars
have around 70 connected ECUs, all of which communicate
through a bus network. The network is usually divided into
multiple subnetworks, each of which also has a bus topology.
Subnetworks can exchange messages through a gateway that
separates their traffics. A common conception is that this
separation is due to security concerns. However, [18] suggest
that this is also for bandwidth concerns. The most common
protocols are (1) the Local Interconnect Network (LIN), used
for relatively low speed applications such as opening/closing
windows; (2) Controller Area Network (CAN), used for soft
real-time applications such as the anti-lock braking system;
(3) Flexray, needed for hard real-time applications where the
speed of transmission is critical such as braking or responding
to an obstacle in front of the car; and (4) Media Oriented
Systems Transport (MOST), used for in-car entertainment
applications [162]. In addition, some cars are equipped with
wireless connections such as Bluetooth and cellular interfaces.
C. CPS Models and Aspects
Fig. 2 shows a high-level abstraction of any Cyber Physical
System, which mainly consists of three categories of com-
ponents: (1) communication, (2) computation and control, and
(3) monitoring and manipulation. The communication could be
wireless or wired, and it could connect CPS with higher-level
systems, such as control centers, or with lower-level compo-
nents in the physical world. The computation and control part
is where the intelligence is embedded, control commands are
sent, and sensed measures are received. The monitoring and
manipulation components connect CPS to the physical world
through sensors to monitor physical components, and actuators
to manipulate them.
Fig. 2. CPS abstract model
A CPS component might have the ability to communicate
with control centers or other CPS components. This same
component could also contain a sensor, an actuator, or both to
connect to the physical world. Each one of these capabilities
has different security implications that may result from the
interactions of the component’s parts and their capabilities.
For example, a CPS component’s communication and compu-
tational functions are not expected to affect the physical world,
and yet might be exploited to cause unexpected attacks with
physical consequences. Similarly, the physical properties of
this component, in addition to the physical properties of the
object of interest in the physical world that the CPS controls
and monitors, can also cause unexpected attacks that might
result in non-physical attacks, such as misleading information
sent to a CPS.
This heterogeneity of CPS, among components, or within
a component itself, results in a lack of understanding of new
types of security threats that would exploit such heterogeneity.
The need to clearly distinguish between such aspects for
security analysis and engineering arises. Thus, we propose
to view any CPS from three aspects: cyber, cyber-physical,
and physical. The cyber aspect considers data computations,
communications, and interactions that do not affect the phys-
ical world, whereas the cyber-physical aspect considers all
interactions with the physical world. The cyber-physical aspect
is where the cyber and physical world can connect. Finally,
the physical aspect includes any physical components that their
properties might have security-related exploitations.
In Figure 3, we incorporated the aforementioned CPS view
in the annotated figure shown in Fig 2. In Figure 3, (1)
indicates aspects that we consider cyber, whereas (2) denotes
cyber-physical aspects. Note the dashed line separating (1)
and (2) shows how the same component can be considered
cyber and cyber-physical at the same time depending on the
presence or absence of the interaction with the physical world.
(4) shows that the physical properties of any part of a CPS
system could play a role in security issues. Therefore, we need
to include them in the physical aspect.
In the following paragraphs, we present how our abstract
model can capture the CPS aspects in the representative
applications. For each application, we show a figure annotated
it with the CPS aspects: (1) cyber, (2) cyber-physical, and (3)
physical.
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Fig. 3. CPS Aspects
ICS. Figure 4 depicts the CPS aspects in a PLC scenario,
where it is used for controlling the temperature in a chemical
plant. The goal is to maintain the temperature within a certain
range. If the temperature exceeds a specified threshold, the
PLC is notified via a wireless sensor attached to the tank,
which in turn, notifies the control center of the undesired
temperature change. Alternatively, in closed-loop settings, the
PLC could turn the cooling system on to reduce that tank’s
temperature within the desired range.
In this figure, the cyber aspects (1) are the cyber interactions
with the PLC such that there is no direct interaction with physi-
cal components, such as cooling fans or the tank. This involves
laptops that can directly connect PLCs, communications with
higher-level environments such as the control center and other
remote entities, and the PLC’s wireless interface that could
be based on long- or short-range frequencies. In addition,
cyber-physical aspects (2) are those that connect cyber and
physical aspects. The PLC, the actuator, and the sensor, are
all cyber-physical aspects due to their direct interactions with
the physical world. The wireless capabilities of the actuator
and the sensor are also considered cyber-physical. Finally, the
physical aspects are the physical objects that need monitoring
and control, i.e. the cooling fans and the tank’s temperature.
Fig. 4. CPS aspects in ICS
Smart Grid. Figure 5 shows a typical scenario in smart
grids. A smart meter is attached to every house to provide
utility companies with more accurate electricity consumption
data and customers with convenient way to track their usage
information. A smart meter interfaces a house’s appliances
and Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) on the
one hand, and interfaces with data collectors on the other.
Wireless communications are the most common means to
communicate with collectors, although wired communications,
such as Power Line Communications (PLC), are also available.
A meter is equipped with a diagnostics port that relies on short-
range wireless interface for convenient access by digital meter
readers and diagnostics tools [78]. The smart meter sends the
measurements to a collector that aggregates all meters’ data in
a designated neighborhood. The collector sends the aggregated
data to a distribution control center managed by the utility
company. In particular, to the AMI headend server that stores
the meters’ data and shares the stored data with the Meter Data
Management System (MDMS) that manages the data with
other systems such as demand response systems, historians,
and billing systems. The headend can connect/disconnect
services by remotely sending commands to the meters. This
feature is a double-edged sword such that it is very efficient
way to control services, yet it could be exploited to launch
large-scale blackouts by remotely controlling a large number
of smart meters.
In Fig. 5, we highlight the CPS aspects in the involved
components that have some interactions with the smart meters.
Cyber aspects (1) appear in the control center where smart
meters’ data is stored, shared, and analyzed and based on
that some decisions can be made based on the analysis. The
control center can also have a cyber-physical aspect (2) when
connect/disconnect commands are sent by the AMI headend to
smart meters. In addition, the cyber-physical aspect (2) is also
apparent in the smart meter itself due to its ability to perform
cyber operations, such as sending measurements to utility, and
physical operations, such as connecting/disconnecting electric-
ity services. Other field devices in the generation, transmission
automation, and distribution plants have a high presence of
the cyber-physical aspect due to their close interactions with
physical aspects of smart grids. Home appliances that are
connected with smart meters are considered cyber-physical
because of the their direct interaction with smart meters. A
utility company can use smart meters to control the amount
of energy consumed by particular home appliances when
needed [118], which is a cyber-physical (2) action.
Fig. 5. CPS aspects in the Smart Grid
Medical Devices. Fig. 6 is an overview of two of the most pop-
ular IMDs, the insulin pump and the implantable cardioverter
defibrillator (ICD). The insulin pump is used to automatically
or manually inject insulin injections for diabetics when needed,
whereas the ICS is used to detect rapid heartbeat and response
by delivering an electric shock to maintain a normal heartbeat
rate [56]. The insulin pump usually needs another device,
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called the continuous glucose monitor (CGM), to receive blood
sugar measurements. Both devices, the insulin pump and the
CGM, require small syringes to be injected into a patient’s
body. The insulin pump receives measurements of glucose
levels from the CGM. Based on the measurements, the pump
decides whether the patient needs an insulin dose or not. The
CGM sends the measurements through wireless signals to the
insulin pump or other devices, such as a remote control or
computer. In addition, some insulin pumps can be commanded
by a remote control held by a patient or physician.
Fig. 6. CPS aspects in medical devices
In this figure, the cyber aspects (1) are embodied in the
monitoring computers in the hospital and the communications
to the Internet. The cyber-physical aspects (2), on the other
hand, are present in those devices that directly interact with
patients’ implanted devices. A patient represents the physical
aspect (3) in the context of medical devices. An IMD connects
to the hospital by sending measurements through an in-home
router. In order to reconfigure an ICD, a physical proximity
is required to be able to do so using a device called the
programmer.
Smart Cars. Figure 7 shows the typical architecture of an
in-car network. Depending on the nature of the tasks expected
from each ECU, an ECU is attached to the appropriate subnet-
work. ECUs from different subnetworks can intercommunicate
through gateways. In this paper we mainly focus on CAN bus
for two reasons: 1) most security issues result from CAN-
based networks and 2) it has been required to be deployed in
all cars in the U.S. since 2008 [80], thus it is in almost every
car around us.
In Fig. 7, we annotated ECUs that do not have any in-
teractions with physical components of the cars as cyber (1).
Examples of which include the Telematics Control Unit (TCU)
and the media player. The TCU has more than a wireless
interface that allows advanced capabilities such as remote
software updates by car manufacturers, phone pairing, hands-
free usage of phones. The cyber-physical (2) annotations
are for ECUs that can legitimately interact with physical
components and manipulate them, such as the parking assist
and the Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems. The RKE, for
example, receives signals to make a physical impact on the
car by locking/unlocking doors. Finally, physical components
such as the engine or tires are physical (3).
Fig. 7. CPS aspects in smart cars
D. Security in CPS
In this section, we motivate the importance of security in
CPS with four specific illustrative examples. Security control
is usually associated with mechanisms such as cryptography,
access control, intrusion detection, and many other solutions
commonly used in IT systems. Those mechanisms are very
important in securing information and communication tech-
nology’s infrastructure. However, many reported attacks on
CPS applications show the inadequacy of the sole dependence
on these mechanisms as presented in Section V. Therefore,
solutions that take cyber-physical aspects into account are
needed and could be complemented with IT security solutions.
Security in ICS. Lack or weakness of security in CPS could
be catastrophic depending on the application. For example,
if the security of CPS used in a nuclear plant has been
compromised, a world-wide threat is the possible consequence.
Furthermore, security violations in smart grids could lead to
the loss of services to the consumer and financial losses to
the utility company. Because of the CPS’s pervasiveness and
its wide use in the critical infrastructure in particular, CPS
security is of a critical importance. In fact, it is even suggested
that ICS is not yet ready to be connected to the Internet [47].
This is due to the inherent security vulnerabilities in the legacy
control systems and their communications.
Security in Smart Grids. Adequate security in smart grids
poses the threat of remote attacks that could result in large-
scale blackouts. Blackouts could result in safety implications
such as medical equipments malfunctions, loss of data in data
centers, and even an increase in crime rate [37]. Another
security inadequacy could result in compromised privacy such
as attackers’ ability to reveal customers’ personal information.
Security in Medical Devices. Security in wearable and IMDs
makes them immune to attacks that might compromise pa-
tients’ safety and privacy.Because of the different circum-
stances surrounding medical devices, the need for defining
appropriate security goals arises. Halperin et al. [57] initiated
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the discussion of the security goals in medical devices by
extending the standard security goals, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. Security goals include the authorized entities
should be able to access accurate data, identify and configure
devices, update software, and maintain the device’s availabil-
ity; whereas privacy goals include the protection of private
information about a device’s existence, type, unique ID, and
patient’s identification.
Security in Cars. Car manufacturers strive to come up with
a variety of innovative technologies that would satisfy their
customers by providing more functionalities and comfort.
Typically cars are safe by design, but security, however, is
not usually of a great concern in the design phase. Safety
ensures the car’s ability to function during non-malicious
incidents. Security, on the other hand, has not been a design
issue, but rather an add-on feature. The new features in
cars require wireless communications and components with
physical impacts. These two features alone result in most
security vulnerabilities and attacks in smart cars.
III. CPS SECURITY THREATS
Securing CPS bears with it various challenges, one of
which is understanding the potential threats [12]. We aim to
tackle this challenge by identifying CPS potential threats and
shedding light on them from different angles. First we discuss
the general threats that almost any CPS application could be
vulnerable to. Then we dive into various threats that are more
specific to each CPS application. Traditionally, in order for a
system to be secure, it satisfies the three security requirements:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Due to the different
nature of CPS and their direct interaction with the physical
world, safety requirements are also crucial. Here we discuss
the threats to both security and safety of CPS.
A. General CPS Threat Model
The knowledge of who/what we protect a CPS from is
equally important to the knowledge of the existing vulnera-
bilities and attack mechanisms. We first need to define what
we mean by a threat. A security threat is defined as “a
set of circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or
harm” [126]. The potentiality aspect is key in this context,
as we discuss potential threats that may not necessarily have
occurred, but might. The loss might be in safety measures,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of resources, whereas
the harm implies harming people, the environment, or systems.
Note that due to the pervasiveness of the CPS applications,
people are increasingly becoming a critical asset to protect,
in addition to the other informational and communicational
assets that are common in security literature.
We identify five factors about every threat: source, target,
motive, attack vector, and potential consequences. Then we
elaborate on each one by showing possible types applicable to
each factor.
(1) Source. The source of a threat is the initiator of an
attack. Threat sources fall into three types: adversarial threats
which pose malicious intentions from individuals, groups
organizations or states/nations; accidental threats are threats
that have been caused accidentally or through legitimate
CPS components; environmental threats which include natural
disasters (floods, earthquakes), human-caused disasters (fires,
explosions), and failures of supporting infrastructure (power
outage or telecommunications loss) [16], [74], [119], [132],
[146], [147], [155].
(2) Target. Targets are CPS applications and their components
or users. We will see specific examples for each application.
(3) Motive. CPS attackers usually have one or more reasons
to launch an attack: criminal, spying, terroristic, political, or
cyberwar [140], [155].
(4) Attack Vector. A threat might perform one type or
more of four mechanisms for a successful attack: interception,
interruption, modification or fabrication [126]
(5) Consequence. Compromising the CPS’s confidentiality,
integrity, availability, privacy, or safety.
B. CPS Security Threats
We explore the potential threats to the four CPS applications
using the proposed threat model. In particular, we highlight the
threats that are specific to each application with respect to the
five factors: source, target, motive, vector, and consequence.
Threats against ICS
• Criminal Attackers (motive). An attacker whose familiar
with the system (source) could exploit wireless capabili-
ties (vector) to remotely control an ICS application and
possibly disrupt its operations (consequence).
• Financially-motivated customers (motive). A capable cus-
tomer (source) aiming to reduce a utility bill might be
able to tamper with a physical equipment or inject false
data (vector) to misinform the utility (target) causing it
to lose financially (consequence) [153].
• Politically-motivated espionage (motive). Intelligence
agencies (source) might perform reconnaissance oper-
ations targeting a nation’s critical infrastructure (tar-
get) possibly through spreading malware (vector) result-
ing in confidentiality violations of critical data (conse-
quence) [106], [115].
• Politically-motivated cyberwar (motive). A hostile nation
(source) could initiate a cyberwar against another nation
(target) by remotely attacking its critical infrastructure,
e.g., nuclear plants and gas pipelines, by spreading mal-
ware or accessing field devices (vector) resulting in a
plant’s shutdown, sabotaging components, or environ-
mental pollution (consequence) [10], [74], [82], [135],
[152].
• Physical threats. An attacker (source) could spoof a
sensor that measures the temperature of a particular en-
vironment (target) by applying heat or cold to it (vector)
resulting in sending misleading false measurements to the
control center (consequence).
Threats against Smart Grids
• Financially-motivated threats (motive). A customer
(source) who wants to trick a utility company’s billing
system (target) might tamper with smart meters (vector)
to reduce the electricity bill (consequence) [4], [102],
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[103], [113], [131]. Another example of this type of threat
is when utility companies (source) might be interested in
gathering customers’ private information (target) by ana-
lyzing their electricity usage to infer habits and types of
house appliances (vector) in order to sell such information
for advertisement purposes resulting in privacy violation
(consequence) [28], [102], [128], [145]. In addition, there
is a possible scenario where criminals (source) extort by
demanding a ransom (vector) in exchange for not taking
down a number of smart meters (target) that might cause
a blackout (consequence) [4].
• Criminally or financially-motivated threat (motive).
Thieves (source) who aim to rob a house (target) might
be able to infer private information, such as a house
inhabitant’s presence, from the communications between
the smart meter and the utility company (vector) in order
to perform a successful robbery (consequence) [145].
• Political threats (motive). A hostile nation (source) might
initiate a cyberwar against another country’s national
power system (target) by gaining remote access to the
smart grids’ infrastructure (vector) resulting in large
scale blackouts, disturbances, or financial losses (conse-
quence) [102].
Threats against Medical Devices
• Criminal threats (motive). A criminal hacker (source)
might aim to harm a patient and affect his/her health
condition (target) by using wireless tools to inject or re-
transmit previously-captured legitimate commands (vec-
tor) in order to change the device’s state and expected
operations resulting in an undesired health condition
(consequence) [57]. In addition, an attacker (source)
might also be able to cause harm (target) by jamming
the wireless signals exchanged between medical devices
to maintain a stable health condition (vector) resulting in
the unavailability of the device and its failure to deliver
the expected therapies (consequence) [57], [58], [134].
• Spying threats (motive). A hacker (source) aiming to
reveal the existence of a disease, a medical device, or
any other information that a patient considers private
(target) by intercepting the communications of a pa-
tient’s medial device via wireless hacking tools (vector),
which results in a violation of privacy and confidential-
ity(consequence) [57]. In addition, as the medical devices
communicate with other parties, such as hospitals, a large
amount of private data is stored in various locations. This
could tempt an attacker (source) with spying motivations
(motive) to gain an unauthorized access to such data
(target) through penetrating the networks that connect
among the involved legitimate parties (vector) resulting
in privacy invasion (consequence) [88].
• Politically-motivated threats (motive). Cyberwar has a
new attack surface by which a hostile nation (source)
could target political figures (target) by attacking their
medical devices exploiting the devices wireless commu-
nications (vector) resulting in a potential critical health
condition or eventual death (consequence) [156]. In fact,
former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney had the wireless
capabilities disabled in his pacemaker because he was
aware of the possible realistic assassination threats [134].
Threats against Smart Cars
• Criminal threats (motive). A hacker (source) could attack
a car’s ECUs (target) by exploiting weakness in the
wireless interfaces (vector) to cause a collision or loss
of control (consequence) [18].
• Privacy threats (motive). A hacker (source) might be able
to intercept private conversations in a car (target) by
exploiting vulnerabilities in the TCU (vector) resulting
in privacy invasion (consequence) [18].
• Tracking threats (motive). A hacker, or a law enforcement
agent, (source) could track a car (target) by exploiting the
GPS navigation system (vector), which is mainly used
for guiding and directing drivers, resulting in privacy
violations [8], [18].
• Profiling threats (motive). Cars manufacturers (source)
can covertly gather cars’ logs stored in ECUs (vector)
to reveal some driving habits and traffic violations (tar-
get) without drivers’ consent or knowledge which is a
violation of privacy (consequence) [8], [64]. Another
threat is that manufacturers (source) could gather driving
habits information (target) that could provide insurance
companies with a pool of personal information that might
be useful for insurance plans’ customization or accident
investigations [8].
• Politically-motivated threats (motive). A hostile nation
(source) might initiate a cyberwar against national trans-
portation roads and their commuters (target) by com-
promising smart cars that are vulnerable to full remote
control (vector) potentially causing large scale collisions
and critical injuries (consequence) [18].
IV. CPS SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we first highlight the causes of existing
vulnerabilities in general CPS. Then we identify application-
specific vulnerabilities. For example, not all vulnerabilities
found in smart grids are found in medical devices and vice
versa. Therefore, we need to distinguish between the generic
and application-specific vulnerabilities, so suitable solutions
can be designed accordingly.
In addition, using the abstract CPS model proposed in
Section II, we classify the vulnerabilities into three types,
according to the CPS aspect a vulnerability appears in: cyber,
cyber-physical, and physical vulnerabilities. One type of vul-
nerabilities may appear in different categories. For example,
the communication between CPS and the external world
(e.g., remote control centers) are considered cyber-, while the
communication among CPS components are considered cyber-
physical-. Cyber and cyber-physical-vulnerabilities in com-
munication systems usually demonstrate different appearances
and properties due to the differences in their origination.
A. Causes of Vulnerabilities
Isolation assumption. The trend of “security by obscurity”
has been dominant in most, if not all, CPS applications since
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their initial design. The focus has been on designing reliable
and safe systems, whereas the security has not been of a great
importance. This is because the systems were supposed to
be isolated from the outside world, and therefore, considered
secure. For example, in ICS and power grids (before they
became “smart”), security relied on the assumption that sys-
tems are isolated from the outside world, and the monitoring
and control operations were performed locally [14], [38], [97].
Furthermore, medical devices, such as IMDs, were originally
designed to be isolated from networks and other external
interactions [57]. In addition, the same isolation assumption
is also present in smart cars where the security of the ECUs’
intercommunications relies on their isolation from adver-
saries [84]. Recent and ongoing advances in CPS applications
do not adhere to the isolation assumption, but rather more
connectivity has been introduced. More connectivity increases
the number of access points to cars, thus more attack surfaces
arise.
Increased connectivity. CPS are more connected than ever
before. Manufacturers have improved CPS by adding services
that rely on open networks and wireless technologies. For
example, ICS and smart grids are connected to control centers
which are connected to the Internet or some business-related
networks. In fact, most ICS attacks have been internal until
2001; after that most of the attacks originate from external
(Internet-based) sources [10]. This is clearly due to the in-
creased connectivity deployed in ICS. In addition, for fast
incident response and more convenience, some field devices
are directly connected to the Internet [89], [143]. Medical
devices have wireless capabilities for easier reconfiguration
and monitoring. Smart cars have more connectivity so they
are referred to as “connected cars”. This connectedness relies
on wireless communications such as Bluetooth, cellular, RFID,
and satellite radio communications.
Heterogeneity. CPS consist of components that are usually
heterogeneous such that COTS, third party, and proprietary
components are integrated to build a CPS application. CPS
are almost always multi-vendor systems, and each product
has its own security problems. For example, a component
might have been manufactured, specified, or implemented
by different entities, and eventually integrated by the system
deployers. Hence, the building components of CPS are more
integrated rather than designed [38]. This integration invites
the inherent vulnerabilities of each product [2]. For example,
one step of the Stuxnet attack was to exploit the default
password in Siemens PLC to access a computer running a
Windows OS [106]. Last, the internal details of the integrated,
heterogenous components are unknown, and thus they may
produce unexpected behavior when they are deployed. In fact,
most of the bugs that led to successful attacks in smart cars,
for example, were found at the boundaries of interconnected
components manufactured by different vendors, where the
incorrect assumptions interact.
B. Cyber Vulnerabilities
ICS Vulnerabilities.
[ICS V1] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-
components. ICS’ reliance on open standards protocols, such
as TCP/IP and ICCP, is increasing. This makes ICS appli-
cations vulnerable as a result of using vulnerable protocols.
TCP/IP’s vulnerabilities have been studied and investigated
for many years, but the protocol still has security issues as
it was not intended to be secure by design [6], [59]. Another
protocol is Remote Procedure Call (RPC), which also has a
number of security vulnerabilities, one of which contributed to
the well-known Stuxnet attack [104]. In addition, ICCP, which
interconnects control centers, lacks basic security measures
such as encryption and authentication [119].
Wired communications in ICS includes fiber-optic and Eth-
ernet. Ethernet is usually used for local area networks in sub-
stations. Because the communication using Ethernet uses the
same medium, it is vulnerable to interception and man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks [67]. For example, an inside attacker
could exploit the privilege of accessing the local network and
impersonate legitimate components. It is also possible to inject
false data or disclose classified information [124], [158].
Short-range wireless communications are usually performed
within the ICS plant assuming an adversary is not able to get
close enough to capture wireless traffic. However, the traffic
is still vulnerable to be captured, analyzed or manipulated by
malicious insiders or even a capable-enough outsider [31].
In addition, when employees connect their own, probably
unsafe, devices to the ICS wireless network, they expose the
network to potential threats, so that an attacker could use the
employees’ personal computers as an attack vector [68]. Long-
range wireless communications such as cellular, microwave,
and satellite are also used in ICS. In the literature, long-range
wireless communication vulnerabilities have not been studied
in the context of ICS. In conclusion, wireless networks are
more vulnerable to cyber attacks, including passive and active
eavesdropping, replay attack, unauthorized access and others
discussed thoroughly in the literature as in [75], [159].
[ICS V2] Software vulnerabilities. A popular web-related
vulnerability is SQL injection, where attackers can ac-
cess databases’ records without authorization [124], [170].
Databases that are connected directly or indirectly to ICS
servers contain important data such as historical data and
users’ information. Furthermore, emails can also contribute
to malware spreading to the network. In [116], a number of
email-based attacks are shown by experimentation. In addition,
gathering security credentials for ICS-connected computers is
a very enticing goal for attackers interested in gaining access
to a secured network. As a result, the network and the ICS as
a whole could be at risk. Finally, vulnerabilities in Internet-
exposed devices that are connected to the local network, such
as servers in the control center, employees’ portable devices
like laptops, and smartphones might be exploited to perform
malicious activities that affect the desired operations of the
control devices [15].
Smart grids vulnerabilities.
[SG V1] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-
components. The smart grid’s information infrastructure relies
on a number of standardized Internet protocols with known
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vulnerabilities that could be used to launch attacks on the
grid. TCP/IP is used for general-purpose connection to the
Internet and is not supposed to connect to control centers.
However, Internet-faced networks are sometimes connected,
directly or indirectly, to the smart grids’ control centers due
to a network misconfiguration [29]. This connectivity itself
is considered a vulnerability, let alone vulnerabilities in the
open protocols. In addition, ICCP, which is the standardized
protocol for data exchange between control centers, has a
critical buffer overflow vulnerability [170].
[SG V2] Software vulnerabilities. Almost the same software
vulnerabilities in ICS hold in smart grids with others that are
smart grids-specific. For example, widespread smart meters
that are remotely upgradeable, inviting a critical vulnerability.
An attacker can make use of such a feature to cause blackouts
by controlling the meters, either from the control center, or the
meters individually. This vulnerability can also be exploited by
a software bug [4]. The grids’ components now become more
accessible in every household, and hence provide a potential
access point for malicious attackers [113]. Some vendors leave
backdoors in smart meters. Santamarta [137] was able to
discover a backdoor in some smart meters that would result in
full control of the meter, including pricing modifications. In
addition, some smart meters can be connected to via Telenet
protocol. This vulnerability can also be exploited to affect
other smart meters in the grid to launch coordinated attacks.
[SG V3] Privacy vulnerabilities. A new type of vulner-
abilities has emerged as a result of the two-way commu-
nications between smart meters at customers’ houses and
utility companies. Attackers may be able to intercept the vast
amount of traffic generated from smart meters and infer private
information about customers [26]. The kind of information
attackers could be interested in is, for example, daily habits
and residences’ presence/absence.
Medical devices vulnerabilities.
[MD V1] Security through obscurity. Because of the lack
of mandatory security standards for manufacturers of medical
devices, some resort to designing proprietary protocols and
rely on their secrecy as a security measure [88]. This paradigm,
a.k.a “security through obscurity” has always failed to thwart
attackers.
[MD V2] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-
components. As most medical devices rely on wireless com-
munications, this implies the devices’ vulnerability to a range
of wireless-based attacks such as jamming, noise, eavesdrop-
ping, replay, and injection attacks. Communications between
ICDs and their programmers are vulnerable to eavesdropping
due to the lack of encryption. Besides this confidentiality
violation, the lack of encryption allows replay attacks [56].
In addition, patients with IMDs or wearable devices could
be vulnerable to a number of privacy invasion attacks ranging
from discovering the existence of the devices, the devices type,
to some physiological measures gathered by the device. In
addition, if a device’s unique information is inferred, a patient
could be vulnerable to tracing attacks [57].
[MD V3] Software vulnerabilities. The role of software has
been growing in medical devices, and so has the likelihood
of software vulnerabilities. As a result, recalls of medical
devices due to software-related defects has increased [49],
[58]. Failure of a device due to a software flaw could result
in critical health conditions. Furthermore, Hanna et al. [58]
presented the first publicly known software security analysis
for medical devices. They found that one type of medical
devices, namely Automated External Defibrillator (AED), to
have four vulnerabilities: arbitrary code execution due to a
buffer overflow vulnerability, weak authentication mechanism,
improper credentials’ storage, unauthorized firmware update
due to improper deployment of the Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC). In addition, certain assumptions by a device designers
could lead to undesired consequences. For example, Li et
al. [91] show how a CRC check in the code can lead to
dangerous attacks such as replaying outdated measures and
sending unauthorized commands.
Smart cars vulnerabilities.
[SC V1] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-
components. Cellular interfaces usually serve two purposes:
(1) enabling hands-free phone calls and (2) enabling manufac-
tures to perform services remotely such as remote diagnostics,
software updates, crash response, and stolen car recovery.
TCUs provide cars with such cellular communication chan-
nels, among others. However, privacy concerns have emerged
from using the cellular interface as a tracking tool where both
Global Positioning System (GPS) and the microphone are parts
of the TCU. This connection reveals a target’s whereabouts,
or can become a spying tool via eavesdropping on the in-car
conversations by exploiting the microphone [17], [18].
Bluetooth is one of the most vulnerable attack vectors in
smart cars [17]. When a passenger wants to pair a phone
with the car, the only authentication measure is a Personal
Identification Number (PIN), prompted by the car’s Telematics
Control Unit (TCU). This measure is insufficient, and attackers
can brute-force the PIN, intercept it, or even inject a false PIN
by spoofing the Bluetooth’s software. In addition, Bluetooth
connections could expose the car to traceability attacks if an
attacker successfully extracts the Bluetooth’s Media Access
Control (MAC) address, which is unique and traceable [18].
[SC V2] Software vulnerabilities. Software is at the heart
of every ECU, and smart cars’ reliance on it has significantly
increased. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of software
bugs and security vulnerabilities [63]. For example, if a piece
of software is vulnerable to malicious code injection, it would
expose the car to various attacks depending on the injected
software. Jo et. al. [72] show how a TCU running on an
Android OS was exploited to unlock doors and trace GPS
due to vulnerabilities in the OS. On the other hand, the media
player has the ability to directly connect to the CAN bus.
This implies that any vulnerability in the player can affect
other ECUs because of this connection. Checkoway et al. [18]
identified two vulnerabilities: 1) a malicious specially-crafted
CD could affect the media player’s ECU and “reflash” it with
malicious data, and 2) the media player is vulnerable to an
arbitrary code execution, thanks to its ability to parse different
media files.
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C. Cyber-Physical Vulnerabilities
ICS Vulnerabilities.
[ICS V3] Communication between ICS components. ICS
relies on protocols that used to be proprietary such as Modbus
and DNP3 to monitor and send control commands from
a control center to sensors and actuators. ModBus proto-
col, the de facto standard for communication in many ICS,
lacks basic security measures, so that it is vulnerable to a
plethora of attacks. Its lack of encryption exposes the traffic
to eavesdropping attacks [1], [9]. It also lacks integrity checks
making data integrity questionable [9], [116]. In addition,
no authentication measures are implemented, suggesting the
feasibility of manipulating data traveling to actuators to make
them act undesirably, or with data coming from sensors so
the controllers can be spoofed by false data [152], [170].
Similarly, DNP3 protocol also does not implement any kind
of encryption or authentication mechanisms [36], [65]. It has,
however, a simple integrity measure using CRC. Although
CRC is relatively simple, it is better than no integrity check
altogether, like in Modbus. East et al. [36] analyzed the
DNP3’s vulnerability to at least 23 attacks that exploit the
absence of encryption, authentication, and authorization.
Direct access to remote field devices such as RTUs and
PLCs used in smart grids is also a vulnerability that might
be overlooked by smart grids’ operators. Some field devices
might be left with default passwords [113]. Furthermore, a
large number of PLCs were found to be directly connected to
the Internet [89]. In fact, Leverett [90] identified 7,500 field
devices that are directly connected to the Internet. Those de-
vices are also used in smart grids, thus the same vulnerability
is also applicable.
Sometimes, in case of failure of the primary communica-
tions, it is useful to have a secondary communication channel
(e.g., dial-up) to access field devices such as PLCs and RTUs.
It provides a direct connection with field devices, which in
turn are directly connected with the sensors and actuators [1].
This poses an opportunity for attackers to take control over the
field devices without the need to exploit other more advanced
communication links, especially in the presence of default
logins and simple authentication mechanisms.
[ICS V4] OS vulnerabilities. The operating systems in ICS
devices, such as PLCs and RTUs, are Real-Time Operating
System (RTOS), and they do not implement access control
measures. Therefore, all users are given the highest privileges,
i.e., root access. This is fundamentally insecure, and clearly
makes the devices vulnerable to various kinds of attacks [170].
Applications that are used for controlling and monitoring
field devices are running on general-purpose OS. If the OS or
running software have vulnerabilities, the hosting computers
or laptops posses a potential attack vector on the connected
field devices and as a result, their physical components. An
example of such exploitable vulnerabilities are two Windows
OS vulnerabilities that were exploited in the Stuxnet attack.
The first one is a vulnerability in the Print Spooler Service,
which is vulnerable to remote code execution over remote
procedure call (RPC) [105]. This particular vulnerability al-
lowed Stuxnet to copy itself onto the vulnerable computer [22].
The other exploited vulnerability was in Windows Server
Service that also was vulnerable to remote code execution
through sending a specially crafted RPC request [104]. Using
this vulnerability, Stuxnet connected to other computers [22].
In addition, some attacks are realized by exploiting buffer
overflow vulnerabilities in the OS running in the control
center [152], [170]. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are the
most commonly reported vulnerabilities to ICS-CERT [66].
[ICS V5] Software vulnerabilities. We consider programs
running on general-purpose OS for controlling and monitoring
controllers as cyber-physical components. An example of such
programs is WinCC, which is a Siemens software used for
controlling PLCs. In the Stuxnet attack, the first step was to
target vulnerable computers running WinCC software [22]. A
vulnerable computer is exploited so Stuxnet can copy itself
onto the computer, it then installs a rogue driver DLL file that
is used by both WinCC software and the PLC. Once the driver
DLL installed, a rogue code is sent to the PLC. The critical
vulnerability in the controller that allows such an action is the
lack of digital signature [83]. PLCs and other field devices
have limited computational capabilities and cannot perform
computationally expensive solutions such as cryptographic
measures. Another class of cyber-physical software compo-
nents cover software running on field devices such as PLCs
and other controllers. As we pointed out earlier, the presence
of COTS products in CPS is one of the contributing factors
for the increased number of vulnerabilities. [89] revealed an
authentication vulnerability in a very common COTS product
deployed in 200 PLC models. This vulnerability allows an
attacker to bypass the authentication and consequently take
control of the PLC. The authors conducted multiple scans
and discovered a surprisingly large number of PLCs that
directly connect to the Internet. In addition, some vendors
leave backdoors in some field devices. This makes it possible
for attackers to gain access and full control over the device
when valid credentials are gathered [137].
Smart Grids Vulnerabilities.
[SG V3] Grid communication vulnerabilities.
The power system infrastructure in smart grids relies on
almost the same protocols in ICS, such as Modbus and DNP3,
thus the same vulnerabilities still hold in smart grids. In
addition, IEC 61850 has also been introduced recently as an
advancement of these protocols in substations’ communica-
tions. The lack of security properties in these protocols has
a different impact in the context of smart grids. For example,
protocols that lack encryption, make the data in transit vulner-
able to eavesdropping, which results in a number of attacks
such as the inference of customers’ usage patterns [101],
[113], or even injection of false information due to the lack
of authentication [129], [158]. It is also possible to inject the
network with bogus packets that aim to flood it, resulting in a
DoS attack; or to inject false information, resulting in decisions
based on false information [145], [164].
In addition, smart grids consist of heterogeneous compo-
nents run by different entities. For example, a generation
plant of a grid interacts with a transmission plant, where
the transmission plant, in turn, interacts with a distribution
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plant, and finally the distribution delivers the electricity to end
users. Each type of interaction is usually run and administered
by different companies, which introduces vulnerabilities in
communication and collaboration [42], [62], [113].
[SG V4] Vulnerabilities with smart meters. Smart meters
rely on two-way communications, which contribute to a num-
ber of new security concerns about an attacker’s abilities to
exploit such interaction [76]. For example, a smart meter may
have a backdoor that an attacker could exploit to have full
control over the device. Santamarta [137] analyzed a smart
meter’s available documentation and found out that there is a
“Factory Login” account. Aside from the customers’ accounts
with limited capabilities used for basic configurations, this
factory login account gives full control to the user over the
smart meter. What’s more, the communication is transmitted
through telnet which is known for major security weaknesses,
e.g., sending data in clear text without encryption.
Once full control over the smart meter is gained, three
potential attacks arise: (1) power disruption, either directly,
by malicious interactions with other devices to change their
desired power consumption, or indirectly, by injecting false
data in a way that the control center receives false information
and consequently makes wrong decisions; (2) using the meter
as “bot” to launch attacks possibly against other smart meters
or systems within the smart grid network; and (3) the meter’s
collected data could be tampered with so that the bill reflects
false data to reduce the cost to the consumer [137].
Medical Devices Vulnerabilities.
[MD V4] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-physical-
components]. The reliance on wireless communications in
wearable and IMDs invites vulnerabilities that could result
in physical impacts on patients when exploited. If medical
devices fail to transmit or receive expected packets, an unde-
sired health condition could result from incorrect operations
performed by the medical device.
As the devices rely on wireless communications, likelihood
of jamming attacks arises. For example, when an insulin pump
does not receive periodic updates from the associated CGM,
it assumes the patient’s condition is stable, and no need for
an injection of an insulin dosage. This leads to an undesirably
high glucose level [91], [130]. Some devices are vulnerable
to battery exhausting attacks, where an adversary exhausts
the devices computational or communication resources to
withdraw the battery’s reserves [56], [134].
By injecting a specially-crafted packet, it is possible to send
unauthorized commands or false data . Halperin et al. [56] and
Gollakota et al. [51] demonstrated the ICDs’ vulnerabilities
to injection attacks by exploiting wireless vulnerabilities. In
addition, Li et al. [91] demonstrated the insulin pump’s vulner-
ability to be remotely controlled by intercepting the device’s
communications with its remote control. Radcliffe [130] also
uncovered a vulnerability in the insulin pump device that
would allow injection attacks. The device requires its serial
number to be part of the command packet as an authentication
measure. An attacker equipped with the serial number can
inject unauthorized commands to the device.
Replay attacks do not require knowledge of the underlying
protocols; instead, an attacker only needs to capture legitimate
measurements or command packets, and retransmits them at
a later time. Li et al. [91] revealed a vulnerability in an
insulin pump that would allow replay attacks so that the pump
receives a dishonest reading of the glucose level. And therefore
the patient decides mistakenly to inject the wrong amount
of insulin such that the decision might threaten the health
condition. In addition, Radcliffe [130] revealed that a CGM
device was vulnerable to replay attacks. By retransmitting pre-
captured packets to the CGM, the author was able to spoof the
CGM with incorrect values. In addition, besides the violation
of confidentiality, lack of encryption allows replay attacks [56].
[MD V5] Device authentication. An attacker can use a com-
mercial programmer without authorization as a result of the
implicit trust given to anyone uses the programmers [56]. This
makes medical devices vulnerable to safety-critical attacks
even without technical knowledge needed for attackers. In
addition, some attacks do not need programmers. Instead,
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) is sufficient to
replace a programmer and send malicious packets as Halperin
et al. [56] have shown.
Smart Cars Vulnerabilities.
[SC V3] Communication vulnerabilities in cyber-physical-
components. Smart cars are vulnerable to many attacks due
to the lack of security considerations in their design [84].
In-vehicle communication protocols, such as CAN and LIN,
lack encryption, authentication and authorization mechanisms.
Here we review the vulnerabilities in the most common proto-
col, CAN. The CAN protocol has a number of vulnerabilities
that contribute to most of the attacks on smart cars. For
example, CAN protocol lacks critical security properties such
as encryption, authentication, and has weak authorization and
network separation. Due to the lack of encryption, TPMS is
vulnerable to eavesdropping and spoofing [70]. Tracing a car
is possible by exploiting the unique ID in the TPMS com-
munications. In addition, the CAN protocol’s broadcast nature
increases the likelihood of DoS attacks [80]. CAN bus error
handling mechanism makes it vulnerable to DoS [24]. Another
security property, common in computer security literature, is
non-repudiation, where there is no way to identify the origin
of a particular message [64]. Clearly, these vulnerabilities,
especially the lack of encryption and authentication, result
from the isolation assumption discussed earlier.
[SC V4] Comfort ECUs. More advanced features are con-
tinuously added to ECUs to improve safety and comfort.
For example, ECUs like Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC),
Lane Keep Assist, Collision Prevention provide safety, where
Comfort Park Assist and RKE are examples of ECUs that
provide comfort. Although these components have a great
impact on improving the driving experience in terms of safety
and comfort, they pose a new type of attacks, i.e., cyber-
physical attacks. These components are part of the CAN
network, and there is a threat of attacking them and com-
promising their expected functions by directly exploiting their
vulnerabilities, or vulnerabilities in other ECUs residing in the
same network [17]. As an example, ACC is the next generation
of cruise control. It provides the ability to detect the speed
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of the car ahead using laser or radar sensors, and adaptively
change the current speed to maintain a safe distance between
cars. A well-equipped attacker might be able to interrupt ACC
sensors’ operations by either introducing noise or spoofing.
As a result of the attack, ACC may reduce or increase speed
unexpectedly, or even cause collisions. The threat is the ability
to tamper with the sensors externally, or with the ACC’s
ECU itself internally, possibly through other ECUs that are
potentially vulnerable to remote attacks such as TPMS, RKE,
or TCU.
[SC V5] Vulnerabilities with X-by-wire. An emerging trend
in smart cars is the “X-by-wire”. It aims to gradually replace
the mechanically-controlled components in the car, such as the
steering wheel and the brake pedal, by electronic or electro-
mechanical components. Such electro-mechanical components
would make drivers control the relevant functionality by
only pressing some buttons. Steer-, Drive-, Brake-, Shift-,
and Throttle-by-wire are all examples of this trend [149].
This implies new opportunities for attackers to launch cyber-
physical attacks exploiting such new functionalities. However,
this technology relies on FlexRay communication protocol,
which is more advanced than CAN protocol in terms of speed
and safety features. However, it is more costly and less likely
to widespread in the near future [149].
D. Physical Vulnerabilities
Finally, we review vulnerabilities in physical components
that would cause cyber impact. Physically tampering with
a physical component or its surrounding environment could
result in misleading data in the cyber-physical components.
Most of the vulnerability analysis in CPS literature focus on
cyber attacks with physical impact. Very few, on the other
hand, studies physical attacks with cyber impact such as
in [98].
ICS Vulnerabilities. The physical exposure of many ICS
components, such as RTUs and PLCs, that are scattered over a
large area is a vulnerability in itself. With insufficient physical
security provided to these components, they become vulner-
able to physical tampering or even sabotage. For example, a
water canal’s sensors rely on solar panels as a source of energy
so they can communicate with the control center. These panels
were stolen, and therefore, the control center lost critical data
necessary for the desired operations [3].
Smart Grids Vulnerabilities. Similar to ICS, smart grids’
field devices are placed in unprotected environments. A huge
amount of physical components are highly exposed without
physical security, and thus vulnerable to direct physical de-
struction. For example, power lines are vulnerable to mali-
cious, accidental, and natural attacks. For example, in Northern
Ohio, overgrown trees caused a large blackout affecting over
50 million people [152].
In addition, smart meters attached to buildings, houses, and
remote areas make them an easy target to various physical
attacks. Mo et al. [113] suggest that it is even infeasible to
achieve adequate physical protection of all assets in smart
grids. Therefore, it is necessary to devise prevention and
detection solutions.
Medical Devices Vulnerabilities. Medical devices, whether
implantable or wearable, sometimes could be vulnerable to
physical access. That is, the attacker’s ability to physically
deal with the medical device. For example, for maintenance
purposes, an attacker exploiting the absence of the device’s
owner, tampers with it, and potentially performs malicious
activities such as malware installation, or modification of
the configurations such that the device delivers unadvised
treatment that could threaten the patient’s health. In addition,
by physical access to a device, it is also possible to get the
device’s serial number, which is useful for some attacks [130].
In general, physical access to the device opens up many
possibilities to various attacks. Hanna et al. [58] recommend
protecting medical devices from physical access by any po-
tential attacker. Another subtle vulnerability to consider is the
mobility of medical devices’ users. It could be a vulnerability
by itself. As the device’s designers cannot control patients’
surroundings, the devices could be vulnerable to unpredicted
physical attacks when a patient is in an insecure location. This
is especially true for politically-motivated attacks [156].
Smart Cars Vulnerabilities. If not physically protected, cars
can be vulnerable to numerous attacks that do not necessarily
require cyber-capabilities. For example, TPMS parts could be
destroyed resulting in DoS attack such that TPMS cannot send
tires’ air pressure to the designated ECU. In addition, exposing
the car to any kind of physical access is another vulnerability
that could cause critical attacks. For example, a mechanic can
get physical access to a car’s internal parts directly through
OBD-II port [162]. Furthermore, some external parts can be
used to access critical components in the car’s CAN network.
Some attackers could get access to the internal network
through exterior exposed components such as the exterior
mirrors [64].
V. REAL-WORLD CPS ATTACKS
We review reported cyber, cyber-physical, and physical
attacks on the four CPS applications that exploited the afore-
mentioned vulnerabilities in Section IV. In general, publicly
known attacks are rare [127], and it is infeasible to find
attacks that represent exploitations of all vulnerabilities in
section IV. Instead, we consider attacks that have been
realized by experimentation or in real life. At the end of
this section, we describe the discussed cyber-physical attacks
using a cyber-physical taxonomy proposed by Yampolskiy et
al. [166] in tables II, III, IV, and V for attacks on ICS, smart
grids, wearable and IMDs, and smart cars, respectively. Their
proposal dissects CPS attacks into six-dimensional description,
by which allows us to gather more insights about each attack.
The description includes the attacked object (Influenced Ele-
ment), the resulting changes on the attacked object from the
attack (Influence), indirectly affected components (Affected
Element), changes on the CPS application (Impact), how the
attack took place (Method), and preceding attacks needed to
make an attack successful (Precondition). We also integrate
our CPS framework into this taxonomy by highlighting CPS
aspects in the attack tables with C, CP, and P, for cyber,
cyber-physical, or physical aspects, respectively.
12
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITIES. C: CYBER, CP: CYBER-PHYSICAL, P:
PHYSICAL; I: ISOLATION ASSUMPTION, C: CONNECTIVITY, O:
OPENNESS, H: HETEROGENEITY, S: MANY STAKEHOLDERS.
CPS Vulnerability Type Cause
ICS
Open communication protocols C I, O
Wired communications C I, H, S
Wireless communications C I, Con
Web-based attacks C Con, H
Insecure protocols CP I, Con
Interconnected & exposed field de-
vices
CP I, Con
Insecure secondary access points CP I, Con
Insecure OS & RTOS CP I, Con, H
Software CP Con, H
Equipments’ physical sabotage P I
Smart Grid
Blackouts CP I, Con, H
Communication protocols C I, Con
Software C I, Con, O, S
Customers’ privacy invasion C I, Con, H
Interconnected field devices CP I, Con, H
Insecure protocols CP I, Con
Insecure smart meters CP I, Con, H
Equipments’ physical sabotage P I
Wearable
& IMDs
Jamming & noise P Con
Replay & injection attacks C, CP I, Con
Patient’s privacy invasion C I, Con
Software C, CP I, H
DoS CP Con
Smart cars
TPMS easy interception CP H
GPS traceability C H
Bluetooth authentication flaw C Con
Insecure CAN bus CP I, Con
Replay attacks CP I, Con
Communication software flaws C Con
Media player exploitations C H
Physically unprotected components P I
In this section, we categorize the attacks based on the
damages’ location. Attacks that do not reach sensors/actuators
are considered purely cyber, while attacks that directly impact
physical components are physical. Whereas, attacks that indi-
rectly impact physical components, through cyber components,
are cyber-physical.
A. Cyber Attacks
ICS Attacks
Communication protocols. A number of attacks have ex-
ploited vulnerabilities in communication protocols. For exam-
ple, spoofing attacks on Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
were demonstrated on SCADA system [68], [154].
Espionage. DuQu and Flame are two examples of ICS
attacks with spying purposes [23], [115]. Flame, for example,
targeted various ICS networks in the Middle East and was
discovered in 2012. This malware’s main goal was to collect
corporations’ private data such as emails, keyboard strokes,
and network traffic [115]. Although the intention of the attack
was not clear, hostile nations or industrial competitors could
benefit from such information leakages.
In addition, in 2013, a group of hackers, known as Drag-
onfly, targeted energy firms in the U.S. and Europe. The
attackers main goal seems to have been gathering private
information. To do that, they needed to infect systems in
the targeted firms with malware that grants remote access.
They started by sending phishing emails to the personnel
of the targeted firms containing malicious PDF attachments.
Then the attack vector escalated to exploiting watering hole
vulnerabilities in victims’ browsers by directing victims to
visit malicious websites hosted by the attackers. Both delivery
mechanisms infected targeted systems with a malware that
allowed attackers to gather private information in the infected
systems [150].
Unintentional attack. Although software updates are critical
to ensuring systems are vulnerability-free, it can be a source
of service disruption. For example, in a nuclear plant, one
computer in the control center was updated and rebooted
thereafter. The reboot erased critical data on the control
system. As the data was erased, other components of the
system misinterpreted such loss, resulting in abnormality in
operations and the plant’s shutdown [14].
Web-based attacks. Night Dragon attack, in 2011, targeted
sensitive information from private networks of a number of
energy and oil companies [1]. The attack combined a number
of web-related vectors to succeed such as SQL injection
vulnerability and a malware injection [1], [106].
Smart Grids Attacks
DoS. The traffic in smart grids is time-critical, so delays
may result in undesired consequences. Flooding the network
at different layers is the probable approach to achieve DoS
attacks. Lu et al. [95] evaluated the impact of DoS on smart
grids’ substations. The authors found that the network per-
formance only gets affected if the flooding is overwhelming.
In addition, at the physical layer, the deployment of wireless
communications increases and therefore, jamming attacks’ are
possible as shown in [96].
False data injection. Introducing false data in smart grids’
traffic leads to different consequences such as service disrup-
tion and financial losses. Liu et al. [94] demonstrated a sim-
ulated false data injection to evaluate the impact on the state
estimation in smart grids. The authors assumed the attacker’s
pre-intrusion to the control center for a successful attack,
which aimed to ultimately inject false measurements to smart
meters to disrupt the state estimate process. Such disruption
leads to financial losses for the operating utilities [158].
Customers’ information. Attackers can analyze network
traffic in smart grids between smart meters and data centers
to infer private information about customers. For example,
an attacker can determine if a target is available at home
at particular times and dates. In addition, it is also possible
to deduce lifestyle in terms of sleeping times and quality,
preferred home appliances, and many more [114].
Untargeted malware. In 2003, the Slammer worm resulted
in disabling the traffic between field devices and substations.
Although that malware was not intended to affect the energy
sector, it still had an effect because of the interconnectedness
of the smart grid networks. The malware consumed a sig-
nificant amount of the time-critical traffic, but did not cause
service outages [10].
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Medical Devices Attacks
Most, if not all, of the reported attacks on medical devices
have been performed in experimental environments. However,
the possibility of the attacks in this section, should raise an
alarm to stimulate the efforts in improving security in medical
devices. Although some attacks are specific to certain devices,
such as insulin pumps, the same attack techniques could be
applicable to other IMDs and wearable devices. This is the
case because of the similarities in the communication links
and hardware components.
Replay attacks. By exploiting a vulnerability in an insulin
pump, replaying eavesdropped packets is possible by incorpo-
rating a previously intercepted device’s PIN [91]. In addition,
replay attacks could result in misinformed decisions regarding
insulin injection [130].
For example, by replaying an old CGM packet to an insulin
pump, a patient will receive a dishonest reading of the glucose
level, and therefore will decide, mistakenly, to inject the wrong
amount of insulin. Such wrong decision could result in critical
health condition.
Privacy invasion. Attacks violating patients’ privacy have
different goals and consequences. For example, for the remote
control attack on the insulin pump in [91], an attacker needs to
learn the device type, PIN, and legitimate commands sent from
the remote control. The authors successfully performed this
attack and revealed three types of privacy-related information,
namely, the devices’ existence, its type, and finally the PIN.
In addition, Halperin [56] demonstrated similar attacks on an
ICD medical device such as revealing patient’s personal and
medical information and the device’s unique information.
Smart Cars Attacks
We reviewed about two dozen papers that discuss the
security of smart cars. Most of the work done is abstract,
theoretical, or simulation-based. Only a few present results of
actual experiments on real cars [18], [64], [80], [107].
In order for a successful attack on a car, an attacker needs
to gain access to the internal network physically, through
the OBD-II port, media player, or USB ports, or wirelessly,
through the Bluetooth or cellular interfaces. Once an attacker
gets into the car’s internal network, a plethora of attacks
opportunities are open.
DoS. DoS attacks can take on different forms whose impacts
vary in safety-criticality. Koscher et al. [80] disabled CAN
communication from and to the Body Control Module (BCM)
which resulted in a sudden drop from 40 to 0 MPH on the
speedometer. In addition, this attack also resulted in freezing
the whole Instrument Panel Cluster (IPC). For example, if
the speedometer was at 60 MPH before the attack, and the
driver increased the speed, there will be no change in the
speedometer and the driver might reach a dangerous speed
level.
False Data Injection (FDI). An example of this attack is
displaying a false speed on the speedometer. An attacker
would first intercept the actual speed update packet sent by
the BCM, and then transmit a modified packet that had the
false speed [80]. In addition, an attacker can forge the real
status of the airbag system to appear healthy, even if the airbag
had malfunctioned or was removed [64]. Another type FDI is
shown in [55] where the authors showed how a passenger
can manipulate the data collected by insurance dongles used
for rate customization in a way that would resulted in an
undeserved lower insurance price.
Privacy invasion. Checkoway et al. [18] were able to exploit
the cellular interface in the TCU and eavesdrop on in-car
conversations. In addition, a report published by Ed Markey,
a U.S. senator, reveals that car manufacturers store a large
amount of private information such as driving history and cars’
performance [100].
B. Cyber-Physical Attacks
ICS Attacks
Legacy communication channels. As we mentioned above,
dial-up connections provide direct access to field devices
and sometimes their security are overlooked. In 2005, billing
information of a water utility was accessed by exploiting the
dial-up connection in a canal system [153]. Although this
attack did not have a physical impact, it could have, due to
the control capabilities provided by the dial-up connection.
Disgruntled insiders. A huge financial loss for utility com-
panies with undesired environmental impacts could result
from attacking a water and sewage system. In 2000, an ex-
employee intentionally disrupted the operations of a sewage
treatment system in Maroochy Water Services in Queens-
land, Australia. The attacker exploited his knowledge, as
a previously-legitimate insider, to change configurations in
pumping stations using a laptop and a radio transmitter. The
consequence of the attack caused a huge amount of raw sewage
to flood into the streets and taint the environment [143].
Modbus worm. Fovino et al. [116] presented an alarming
work on targeted malware. The authors crafted malware that
exploits the lack of authentication and integrity vulnerabilities
in Modbus protocol. The worm aims to perform two attacks:
DoS, by identifying sensors or actuators and sending them
DoS-inducing messages, and command injection, by sending
unauthorized commands to the sensors or actuators.
Malware. Some malware targets specific systems to achieve
goals like traffic interception and interruption of operations.
They exploit software vulnerabilities in applications that man-
age control field devices. A well-known example is Stuxnet.
This attack is considered one of the most sophisticated attacks
on ICS that clearly embodies cyberwar. Stuxnet exploits soft-
ware vulnerabilities to achieve physical consequences [166].
Because the targeted networks were off the Internet, it is
believed that the delivery mechanism was a USB stick. The
attack can be generally summarized into two phases: 1) spread-
ing and determining targets and 2) PLCs hijacking [83]. The
first step was realized by exploiting two zero-day Windows
vulnerabilities, i.e, one in the shared printing server and the
other was in Windows Server Service. Both vulnerabilities
would allow remote code execution using RPC. Stuxnet used
the first vulnerability to install itself in the system and the other
to connect to other systems to also install itself in an iterative
fashion. This process led to infecting about 100,000 infected
systems worldwide, however, because the attack was targeted
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on specific PLCs, the infection did not have an influence
on systems that were not connected to the targeted PLCs.
Once Stuxnet is installed, it looks for a specific software used
for monitoring and sending commands to the PLCs, that is
Seimens WinCC. It goes through a thorough analysis to ensure
that WinCC is connected to one of specific Siemens PLCs [83].
Once determined, the malware injects the malicious code that
aims to alter PLCs’ configuration. Once that is achieved, the
final objective of the attack is realized, which is, most likely,
damaging centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. For a
detailed Stuxnet analysis, we refer you to [120].
Web-based attacks. A group of hackers exploit a web-based
interface that is directly connected to field devices like PLCs.
They opened multiple connections and left them open until
authorized users could not access them, resulting in a DoS
attack. In addition, they also sent a web page to the controller/
field device that contains malicious Java script code designed
to exploit a bug in the TCP/IP stack causing resetting of the
controller [153].
Smart Grids Attacks
Cyber extortion. This type of attack is rare, at least pub-
licly, where attackers take control over the target smart grid
and make demands as a price of not causing a large-scale
blackout [117].
Blackouts. In the context of smart grids, a blackout is
considered a DoS attack. The availability of smart grids is
probably the most important security goal to maintain, and
attacks aiming to compromise it could result in a large-scale
blackout that might have a nationwide impact. In 2007, Idaho
National Laboratory (INL) demonstrated an experiment on
how a generator could be damaged as a result of a cyber
attack [30]. The experiment proved the feasibility of such
attacks. For example, it is believed that two blackouts in Ohio
and Florida in 2003 were caused by a Chinese politically-
motived group, the People’s Liberation Army [60]. In addition,
about 800 blackouts in the U.S. occurred in 2014 for unknown
reasons [37]. Some speculations suggest that such mysteri-
ous outages may have resulted from cyber-physical attacks
launched by hostile nations [60].
Medical Devices Attacks
DoS attacks. This attack, when successful, could lead to
critical health condition to patients. Halperin et al. [56] were
able to disable an ICD therapies by replaying a previously
recorded “turn off” command sent by the programmer.
False data and unauthorized commands injection. Li et
al. [91] were able to remotely control an insulin pump’s remote
control and successfully stopped and resumed the insulin
injection from a 20 meter distance.
Replay attacks. By exploiting a software vulnerability in the
replay attacks countermeasure, any packet can be retransmitted
to the CGM and insulin pump [91], [130].
Smart Cars Attacks
DoS. One form of DoS attacks is where an attacker prevents
passengers from closing any opened windows. Another is to
disable the warning lights or the theft alarm system, so that the
car cannot produce warnings and alarms when needed [64]. In
addition, jamming of wireless communications is also a form
of DoS such as jamming RKE signals [160].
Malware injection via Bluetooth. Checkoway et al. [18] con-
ducted an attack that exploits compromised devices connected
to the car through a Bluetooth connection. The authors assume
the attacker’s ability to first compromise a connected device
to the car, usually a smartphone. Then they launch an attack
exploiting the connectivity between the Bluetooth’s ECU,
which is the TCU, with the other ECUs. This was realized by
installing a hidden malware, Trojan Horse, on the connected
smartphone. The malware captures Bluetooth connections and
then sends a malicious payload to the TCU. Then once the
TCU is compromised, the attacker can communicate with
safety-critical ECUs, such as the Anti-Lock Braking System
(ABS). In addition, Woo et al. [163] showed a wireless attack
that exploits a malicious diagnostic mobile app connected to
the OBD-II port via Bluetooth. Since the app runs on a mobile
device, te attack can be launched through a cellular network.
Malware injection via cellular network. The cellular channel
in the TCU is exploitable and vulnerable to malware injection
attacks. The attack is realized by calling the target car and
injecting the payload by playing an MP3 file [18].
Malware injection via the OBD-II port. Malware injection
through the OBD-II port needs physical access to the car.
Hoppe et al. [64] show how an injected malware can launch
a number of DoS attach such as preventing passengers from
opening and closing windows and also preventing the car from
displaying that airbags are lost.
Packet injection. This attack requires previous access to
the CAN network. Once an attacker gets into the network,
physically or wirelessly, a large number of attacks are possible.
For example, through the OBD-II port, it is possible to increase
the engine’s Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), disturb the en-
gine’s timing, disable the engine’s cylinders, and disable the
engine itself. In addition, attacks on brakes are also possible
by injecting random packets to the Electronic Brake Control
Module (EBCM) such that it locks and releases the brakes
resulting in unsafe driving experiences [80]. In addition, Lee
et. al. [87] performed fuzzing attacks on multiple cars that
resulted in arbitrary behaviors that could affect passengers’
safety. The fuzzing attack is simple, they captured the CAN
IDs of the normal network traffic and then flood the network
with packets that have the same IDs but different data fields.
Replay attacks. This attack requires two steps: 1) inter-
cepting the CAN network traffic when certain functions are
activated and 2) retransmitting the observed packet to reacti-
vate the same function. Koscher et al. [80] were successfully
able to disable the car’s interior and exterior lights by sending
previously-eavesdropped packets.
C. Physical Attacks
ICS Attacks
Untargeted attacks. Zotob worm, although not targeted on
ICS, caused manufacturers to shut down their plants. For
example, US-based DaimlerChrysler had to shutdown thirteen
of their manufacturing plants for about an hour [152]. Such
an incident stimulated researchers to examine the impact of
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unintended malware intended for tradition IT systems, on
ICS networks. For example, Fovino et al. [116] showed how
unintended malware could result in collateral damages ranging
from causing ICS servers to reboot, opening potential arbitrary
code execution vulnerabilities, infecting personal computers,
and stimulating DoS attacks.
Smart Grids Attacks
Natural and environmental incidents. We give a few ex-
amples of power blackouts in 2014 that resulted from natural
causes to show the impact of physical exposure and unreliabil-
ity of smart grids’ components. An ice storm in Philadelphia
affected 750,000 people for several days with no electricity,
whereas a tornado hit the New York area affecting 500,000
people [37]. Furthermore, the widespread power transmission
lines around various environments and conditions contributed
to unexpected attacks such as overgrown or falling trees.
For example, some overgrown trees caused a large blackout
affecting over 50 million people in Northern Ohio [152]. This
incident, however, is controversial and security analysts sug-
gest that it resulted from a cyber-physical attacks originating
from China [60]. In addition, in 2014, wild animals caused
150 blackout in the U.S. by eating and damaging cables [37].
Theft. Copper wires and metal equipments are profitable
targets for financially-motivated thieves. For examples, theft
caused a blackout with an impact on 3,000 people in West
Virginia [37].
Car accidents. In 2014, 356 outages in the U.S. were caused
by cars hitting transmission towers, transformers, or power
poles [37].
Vandalism. Attackers can physically damage parts of smart
grids such as cables, poles, generators, smart meters, and
transformers. An example of that is an incident in 2013 where
a sniper in California shot more than a hundred shots at a
transmission substation, leaving 17 transformed damaged [46].
Terrorist attacks. In 2014, the first terrorist attack on a power
grid occurred in Yemen. The attackers launched rockets to
destroy transmission towers and caused a nationwide blackout
affecting 24 million people [69].
Medical Devices Attacks
Acquiring unique IDs. Obtaining devices’ serial numbers is
an example of attacks that require physical access to the target
devices [130].
Smart Cars Attacks
Relay attacks. This kind of attack targets the RKE, where
an attacker relays the communications between the car and
its key fob. The attack exploits the periodical LF beacon
signal the car sends to detect if the key fob is in close
range. The attacker captures and relays it, using an antenna,
to the relatively far key fob, which is most likely in the
car owner’s pocket. The key fob is activated by the relayed
signal and sends an “open” Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
signal to open the car. Once the car is opened, the same
attack is repeated from inside the car to start it. The attack
was implemented successfully on ten different cars from eight
manufacturers. In addition, it evades cryptographic measures
because it targets communications at the physical layer [48].
This kind of attack is also called Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
or “two-thief” attacks [160]. In addition, Garcia et al. [50]
presented a attack on the RKE system used in many cars. The
attack relies on exploiting the simple cryptographic algorithms
and inadequate key management in order to clone a car’s key
resulting in an unauthorized access to the car. key
ABS Spoofing. Shoukry et al. [141] showed a physical attack
on the ABS wheel speed sensor. The sensor measures the
speed of a wheel using a magnetic field the gets induced by the
iron tone wheel attached to every wheel. In the demonstrated
attack, the authors introduced a malicious actuator that pro-
duces another magnetic field that disrupts the original field
produced by the wheel speed sensor. This additional field
results in inaccurate speed measurements received by the ABS
ECU. The authors also demonstrated a spoofing attack that
allows attackers to inject incorrect speed measures and spoof
the ABS ECU.
VI. SECURITY CONTROLS/SOLUTIONS
We briefly describe the research trends in CPS controls in
two distinct paths. The first one is the solution that targets
CPS in general, regardless of the application. The second is
application-specific solutions that are specifically designed for
some applications. In addition, we will highlight, whenever
applicable, some solutions that can be cross-domain. That is,
for example, some solutions designed for cars could be applied
to medical devices, or vice versa.
A. General CPS Controls
Here we review controls that consider securing CPS, regard-
less of the application. Addressing the vulnerability causes is
the first step in the solution.
Controls against more connectivity. New security consider-
ations must be taken into account to secure the access point
from unauthorized access. Furthermore, the communication
protocols used for realizing such connectivity are either pro-
prietary protocols, such as Modbus and DNP3 in deployed
ICS and smart grids, or open protocols such as TCP/IP. The
proprietary protocols are burdened with a lot of vulnerabilities
due to the isolation assumption when the protocols were
designed [2].
Communication controls. Security solutions at the commu-
nication level in ICS should consider the differences with
traditional IT solutions. For example, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) should be time-critical so that long delays are
intolerable [112]. In [108], [111], the authors focus on design-
ing IDS solutions for CPS. They also provide a comprehensive
survey on IDS solutions in CPS applications [112].
Device Attestation. CPS components running software need
to verify the software’s authenticity. This verification helps
significantly minimize malware. For example, hardware-based
solutions such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) provides
code attestation. However, TPMs are assumed to be physical
secure, which is infeasible to guarantee in some CPS appli-
cations such as ICS and smart grids. Another problem with
TPM is the computational overhead on the limited resource
CPS applications. Therefore, a new generation of TPMs that
considers the limited CPS resources is needed.
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TABLE II
ICS CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Name IE a I b AE c Impact Method Precondition Ref
Maroochy Pumps Pumps work
undesirably
Correct settings
in pumping
stations
manipulated
Raw sewage
flood in
streets, tainted
environment, and
financial losses
Used a laptop
and a radio
transmitter to
manipulate
pumps
Insider knowledge [143]
Modbus
worm
ICS network Infected ICS
network
Connected field
devices
Servers’
rebooting, DoS,
& unauthorized
commands
injection
Inject malware
code into ICS
network traffic
Access to ICS traffic [116]
Stuxnet Centrifuges
PLCs
Exaggerated
rotation of
centrifuges
Centrifuges’
rotors
Lifetime
reduction &
physical damage
Illegitimate
commands from
PLCs sent to
centrifuges
Infected PLC by
Stuxnet
[22], [83],
[120], [166]
Web-based
attacks
Field devices
(e.g. PLCs)
Field devices
web interface
feature
The physical
environments
controlled by
devices
Legitimate
personnel unable
to connect to
field devices
remotely or
locally (DoS)
Leave devices
with open
connection state
Devices are directly
exposed to the Inter-
net
[153]
Web-based
attacks
Field devices
(e.g. PLCs)
Field devices
web interface
feature
The physical
environments
controlled by
devices
Devices lost con-
figurations
Malware
injection
TCP/IP vulnerability
in a COTS implemen-
tation
[153]
aInfluenced Element
bInfluence
cAffected Element
TABLE III
SMART GRIDS CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Name IE I AE Impact Method Precondition Ref
Cyber ex-
tortion
Power deliv-
ery
Utilities lose
control over their
grid system
Customers Lost of services
& financial losses
Exploit Internet-
connected smart
grid components
Inside knowledge [117]
Aurora ex-
periment
Circuit
breakers (P)
Change relay be-
havior (CP)
Power generators
and power-fed
substations (CP)
Physical damage
to generators
& inability to
deliver electricity
(P)
Unexpected
opening &
closing of circuit
breakers (CP)
Access & inside
knowledge (CP)
[168]
B. System-specific Controls
ICS Controls.
New design. ICS needs security solutions that are specifi-
cally designed for it. Such solutions should take into consider-
ation the cyber-physical interactions, and the heterogeneity of
components and protocols. Cardenas et al. [12] suggest that,
most of the solutions in ICS aim to provide reliability, i.e., they
make ICS reliable in the presence of non-malicious failures.
Although reliability is important, malicious cyber attacks are
now possible more than ever, and must be considered when
designing new solutions. Therefore, security is as important
as reliability.
Protocols with add-on security. Security solutions at the
ICS communication level should consider the fundamental
differences from traditional IT solutions. A number of pro-
posals that rely on modifications of currents protocols, such
as Modbus, DNP, and ICCP, to integrate security. Fovino et
al. [45] proposed the Secure Modbus framework. It provides
authentication, non-repudiation, and thwart replayed packets.
Majdalawieh et al. [99] proposed DNPSec framework, which
adds confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
IDS. The complexity of designing IDS for securing ICS
is relatively less than it is in traditional IT security. This is
due to the predictability of the traffic and the static topol-
ogy of the network [82]. Zhu et al. [171] defined a set
of goals that IDS in ICS are expected to monitor such as
detection of 1)any access to controllers and sensors/actuators’
communication links, 2)modifications in sensor settings, and
3)actuators’ physical tampering. D‘Amico et al. [31] propose
WildCAT, a solution that targets the physical exposure of the
wireless communications within an ICS plant. It is a prototype
for securing ICS from cyber attacks that exploits wireless
networks. The idea is to install WildCAT in security guards’
cars and to collect wireless activities in the physical perimeter
of the plant. The collected data is sent to an analysis center,
which, in turn, detects any suspicious activities and direct
the guards to the location causing such activities. For further
analysis of the current ICS-specific IDS solutions, we refer
you to [5], [7], [19], [81], [82], [112], [171].
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TABLE IV
MEDICAL DEVICES CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Name IE I AE Impact Method Precondition Ref
DoS A medical
device
The device is
turned off
Patients Patient does not
receive expected
therapy (DoS)
Retransmit “turn
off” command
Capture “turn off”
previously sent by
the programmer
[56]
False data in-
jection (FDI)
Insulin pump False
measurements
sent to insulin
pump
Patient’s
therapeutic
decisions
Wrong decisions Impersonate
CGM and by
sending similar
packets with
false data
Interception of CGM
and insulin pump
communications
[91]
Unauthorized
commands
injection
Insulin pump Unauthorized
commands sent
to insulin pump
Patient’s safety Dangerous health
condition
Impersonate
insulin pump
remote control by
sending similar
packets with
unauthorized
commands
Interception commu-
nications between in-
sulin pump and its
remote
[91]
Remote access to field devices. Fernandez et al. [41] sug-
gest that only authorized personnel can remotely access field
devices. In addition, the access should be strictly secured by
using a designated laptop through a VPN. In addition, Turk et
al. [153] suggests a simple control for web-based DoS attacks
that field devices with web access features are vulnerable to.
The author suggests to close idle connections. In addition, it
could be a good measure to disallow multiple connections si-
multaneously. Usually, no more than one legitimate employee
tries to access such a resource at the same time.
Encryption and key management. There is undoubtedly a
need for encryption in ICS networks. One of the associated
problems with encryption is the delay, which is not desirable in
time-sensitive environments. Choi et al. [27] proposed an ICS-
specific key management solution that does not cause delay.
In addition, Cao2013ALayeredet al. [11] proposed a layered
approach aiming to protect sensitive data in the widespread
ICS environments. Their technique relies on Hash Chains to
provide: 1) layered protection such that ICS is split into two
zones: high and low security levels, and 2) a lightweight key
management mechanism. Thanks to the layered approach, an
attacker with full control of a device in the low security level
cannot intercept data from higher security level zones.
Software controls. Regular patching of security vulnera-
bilities in operating systems and their applications is a vi-
tal security practice. Windows released Stuxnet-related secu-
rity patches, without which, Stuxnet would have still been
present [83]. However, vendors of ICS applications must also
keep up with the patching and release compatible versions
of their applications. This ensures that ICS operators do not
resort to older versions of vulnerable OS to be able to use the
compatible ICS application [73].
Standardization. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) is one of the leading bodies in the stan-
dardization realm. Following ICS security standards like theirs,
among others, should significantly contribute to securing ICS.
For example, Stouffer et al. [147] provided a comprehensive
guidelines for ICS security. They provide guidelines for tech-
nical controls such as firewalls, IDS, and access control, and
operational controls such as personnel security, awareness,
and training. In fact, technical and operational controls must
always go hand in hand, and the negligence of one leads to
serious attacks. For example, lack of awareness could make
employees vulnerable to social engineering attacks such as
phishing. ICS-CERT reported that most of the attacks on
ICS originated from phishing emails with malware-infected
attachments [1]. In addition, security experts evaluated the
security of an ICS corporation, and were able, through so-
cial engineering and phishing, to gain employees’ creden-
tials [119]. Sommestad et al. [144] conducted a comparison,
based on keywords mining, and concluded that the standards
focus either on technical controls, or operational controls, but
not both. In addition, some standards somewhat neglect ICS-
specific properties and focus on IT security countermeasures
alone.
Smart Grids Controls.
DoS controls. Attacks on communication components
should be prevented or, at least, detected. On the one hand, at
the network layer, prevention of attacks like DoS is usually
achieved by rate-limiting, filtering malicious packets, and
reconfiguration of network architecture. The first two are
possible in smart grids, while the last might be difficult due
to its relatively static nature. Furthermore, techniques at the
physical layer aim at preventing attacks of the nature of wire-
less jamming. On the other hand, DoS detection techniques
are categorized into four types: signal-based, packet-based,
proactive, and hybrid detection [158].
IDS. IDS for smart grids is still an ongoing problem that
is not that mature yet. Designing IDS for smart grids is a
complex task due to the enormous size of the grids and the
heterogeneity of their components [145]. In addition, IDS built
for traditional IT systems will not necessarily work for the
smart grids. They must be specifically designed for smart grids
to reduce the likelihood of false detection rates. Jin et al. [71]
proposed an anomaly-based IDS that detect malicious behavior
using invariant detection and artificial ants with Bayesian
reasoning approach. In addition, Mitchell and Chen [110]
proposed a behavior-rule-based IDS to detect attacks on cyber-
physical devices in smart grids such as headends, subscriber
energy meters (SEMs), and data aggregation points (DAPs).
Liu et al. [93] proposed an IDS for detecting bad data injection
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TABLE V
SMART CARS CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Name IE I AE Impact Method Precondition Ref
DoS 1 BCM Sudden drop in
speedometer
IPC Frozen IPC and
failure in turning
car on/off
Disabling
communication
to/from BCM
Physical access to
CAN bus
[80]
DoS 2 Windows Window closing
failure
Windows control
buttons
Discomfort and
frustration
Reverse
engineering
and fuzzing
Physical access [64], [80]
Malware
injection 1
Bluetooth
ECU
Ability to
connect to
other ECUs
Safety-critical
ECU with
cyber-phyiscal
capabilities
Loss of control
and potentially
collision
Malware
injection to
other ECUs via
Bluetooth’s ECU
Vulnerability in
Bluetooth pairing
mechanism
[18]
Malware
injection 2
Telematics
unit cellular
interface
Malware
injection
Loss of control
over other ECUs
Remote control
and cyber-
physical attacks
Call car and in-
ject malware pay-
load
Knowledge of car’s
specifics
[18]
Malware
injection 3
An ECU ECU becomes an
attack vector to
inject undesired
packets
CAN bus traffic
becomes vulnera-
ble to malicious
packets
Other ECU
behaves
undesirably
affecting
cyber-physical
components
Transmit
malware in
CAN packets
Physical access or
vulnerable wireless
interfaces
[64], [80]
Packets
injection
Varies,
depending
on target
ECU
Varies Other ECUs and
physical compo-
nents
False data
injection, loss of
control, DoS, and
safety-critical
consequences
Compromised
ECUs inject
packets
Malware injection [64], [80]
Replay
Attack
Lights ECUs Lights turned off Driver,
passengers,
and surrounding
cars
Safety-critical
situation
Eavesdrop
and retransmit
legitimate
commands
Access to CAN bus
network
[80]
Car’s spying TCU Gain control of
car
All other ECUs
can be remotely
controlled
Stealthily turn on
car’s microphone
Call the car Buffer overflow vul-
nerability and flaw in
authentication proto-
col
[18]
Relay attack RKE system Open, and
start a car
without owner’s
knowledge
Target car Theft and unau-
thorized access
Capture and
relay LF beacon
signals from car
to key fob, and
relay resulting
UHF signal from
key fob to car
Attacker needs relay-
ing tools e.g., an-
tennas and amplifiers
among other devices
[48]
attacks targeting the smart grids. Their approach relies on
combining detecting techniques from the traditional IDS and
physical models.
Low-level authorization and authentication. A common
problem in a large system like smart grids is authentication
and authorization of users who need to gain access to low-
level layers such as field devices. Commonly, all field devices
share the same password that employees know. This results in
the impossibility of the non-repudiation security requirement.
A malicious employee could gain access to a field device and
make undesired changes to the system, and there is no way
to trace who did it. Therefore, Vaidya et al. [157] proposed
an authentication and authorization mechanism that provides
legitimate employees the ability to access field devices in the
substation automation systems in smart grids. Their proposal
relies on elliptic curve cryptography due to its low computation
and key size requirements compared with other public key
mechanisms.
New designs. New security issues require that various as-
pects of smart grids be approached differently. The cyber-
physical nature of the systems needs to be considered. Mo et
al. [113] proposed Cyber-Phyiscal Security, a new approach
that combines systems-theoretic and cyber security controls.
They provide two examples showing the applicability of their
approach on two attacks on smart grids: replay attack, and
stealthy deception. They emphasize the need for consider-
ing those two types of components, cyber- and physical-
components, when designing controls for smart grids. Most
of the work done is extending existing protocols and systems
to capture security properties. This might work as a temporary
solution, but a bottom-up redesign is desired.
Security extensions. The trend of adding-on security to ex-
isting components of smart grids has been emerging. Protocols
like DNP3, IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 are extended to capture
security properties. For example, Secure DNP3 protocol is an
extended DNP3 that have basic authentication, integrity and
confidentiality services. The security features are added by
inserting a security layer in the communication stacks of these
protocols [158].
Privacy-preserving controls. Lack of confidentiality in data
aggregation protocols might result in privacy invasion of
consumers’ private information such as billing information and
usage patterns [102], while the lack of integrity could result in
disruption in state estimation and consumption reports [145].
Therefore, a number of privacy-preserving techniques have
emerged to provide aggregated data with confidentiality and
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integrity when in transit between smart meters and control
centers [40], [158]. Another privacy concern that might affect
safety or finance is the ability to detect the (in)occupancy of
house in order to break in. Chen et al. [20] proposed combined
heat and privacy (CHPr) mechanism such that it makes the
poser usage data always looks like the house is occupied and,
therefore, tricks occupancy detection techniques.
Standardization. A number of bodies, such as the IEC and
NIST, have developed a set of standards for securing smart
grids’ communications. For example, IEC’s have developed
standards TC57 and 6235 [29], while NIST has developed
guidelines for smart grids in report 7628 [122].
Smart meters’ disabling prevention. To prevent remote
attackers who exploit the disabling feature in smart meters,
Anderson and Fuloria [4] suggest that smart meters should be
programmed to notify customers in enough time in advance,
before the command takes effect and disables meters. This
measure helps in the early detection of DoS attempts before
they take place.
Physical security. As smart meters are physically exposed,
they must be physically protected. NIST standards [122] state
that smart meters must have cryptographic modules in addition
to physical protection. The standards also emphasize on the
need for smart meters to be sealed in tamper-resistant units
such that unauthorized parties are not able to physically tamper
with them.
Medical Devices Controls.
Authentication.Halperin et al. [56] proposed a
cryptographic-based authentication and key-exchange
mechanism to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing
IMDs. Both mechanisms do not consume batteries as a source
of energy. Instead, they rely on external radio frequency.
In addition, Out-of-Band (OBB) authentication is deployed
in some wearable and implantable devices. By which,
authentication is performed using additional channels, other
than the channels used for communication, such as audio
and visual channels [134]. In addition, biometrics, such
as electrocardiograms, physiological values (PVs), heart
rate [138], glucose level and blood pressure, can all be used
for key generation for encrypted communication in the body
sensor network (BSN) [134]. In addition, patients’ movement
can be another property by which keys are derived [123].
Intrusion Detection Systems. Halperinet al. [56] proposed
a detection mechanism that alarms patients of unauthorized
communication attempts with their IMDs. In addition, Gol-
lakota et al. [51] proposed the Shield, which detects and
prevents malicious wireless-based attacks on IMDs. Although
the Shield is not designed specifically as an IDS, it certainly
serves as one. On the other hand, Mitchell and Chen [109] aim
to detect compromised sensors and actuators that pose threat
to patients’ safety through behavior rule-based IDS. Their
proposal is not intended for IMDs or wearable devices. Rather,
it is mainly for stand alone medical devices, such as vital sign
monitor and cardiac device. Thus, there is a need for IDS
solutions that consider implanted and wearable devices’ unique
properties, e.g., communication protocols, physical interaction
with human bodies, and limited resources.
Location-based controls. Some solutions utilize distance-
bounding protocols that rely on the physical distance between
communicating devices so that remote attackers cannot launch
attacks remotely. The distance is determined by various tech-
niques such as ultra sound signals, received signal strength
(RSS), electrocardiography (ECG) signals [169], and body-
coupled communication (BCC). This technique provides au-
thentication but not authorization. Hence, other techniques
must be incorporated [134].
Thwarting active and passive attacks. Li et al. [91] proposed
the use of BCC, were they experimentally investigate the
BCC’s ability to prevent passive and active attacks against
insulin delivery systems. This type of communication thwarts
most passive and active attacks because of its dependence
on the human body as its transmission medium, as opposed
to conventional wireless communication where the air is the
communication medium that is easily intercepted. When the
human body becomes the transmission medium, an attacker
needs a very close proximity to a patient or even direct body
contact. This significantly mitigates the attacks and raises the
bar for the attackers.
Shifting security to wearable devices. Incorporating security
into the current IMDs and wearable devices has its own risks
and challenges. One of which is the health risk associated
with IMDs’ surgical extraction from a patient in order to
update or replace an IMD with more secure one. In fact,
even if we assume that there are no health risks for extracting
IMDs, the cryptographic operations required for any secure
system are still expensive in terms of computational, memory,
and battery resources. Therefore, the intuitive solution is to
add another device built specifically to add security. Several
proposals that deploy some cryptographic and anti-jamming-
attack mechanisms utilize external wearable devices to realize
such mechanisms. For example, Xu et al. [165] proposed
IMDGuard to defend against jamming and spoofing attacks. In
addition, Gollakota et al. [51] proposed an external wearable
device, the shield, to detect and prevent any unauthorized
commands sent to an IMD. They evaluated the shield on
two modern IMDs, i.e., ICD and cardiac resynchronization
therapy device (CRT). This device jams any signals initiated
by unauthorized party.
Cross-domain solutions. Li et al. [91] proposed the adoption
of the rolling code encryption mechanism used in RKE in cars.
Smart cars and medical devices both share similar features in
terms of computation limitations, power, and data bandwidth
constraints. Therefore, using rolling code encryption should
be an effective solution to prevent eavesdropping and replay
attacks.
Standardization and recommendations. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is the leading body in medical devices’
standardization. It has issued a number of standards and guide-
lines for the manufacturers of medical devices. For example, in
2005, the FDA highlighted that potential vulnerabilities might
result from using COTS software equipped with remote access
capabilities [43]. Another recommendation was published in
2014 about cybersecurity in medical devices [44]. However,
the recommendations are not detailed enough nor mandatory,
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rather ”non-binding recommendations”. Therefore, manufac-
turers have the liberty to choose not to follow them, which
certainly would contribute to the production of less secure
medical devices. In addition, IEEE 802.15.6 is the latest BAN
standard that provides security services such as authentication
and encryption [54]
Allowing vs. disallowing remote functionalities. In order
to prevent attackers from penetrating networks that make the
interaction between remote physicians with patients’ devices
possible, manufacturers should disable remote capabilities
from being sent through the network. They only allow remote
parties to receive measures and logs, but not send commands.
Although this is a good security practice to prevent attackers
from sending remote commands, it limits the full utilization
of such devices [88]. Therefore, there is a need to strike a
balance between security and usability without introducing
remote threats to patients. If remote commands are allowed,
Hayajneh et al. [61] proposed an approach to protect patients
from unauthenticated remote commands against their IMDs.
The approach relies on Rabin public-key cryptosystem.
Smart Cars Controls
Unimplemented promising controls. A number of security
controls have been proposed to secure the in-car network, most
of which have not been implemented. For example, Wolf et
at. [162] proposed three controls that would secure the bus
network: authentication gateway, encryption, and firewalls. In
addition, Larson et al. [84] call for redesigning security in
cars, and propose embracing of the defense-in-depth security
paradigm, i.e., prevention, detection, deflection, countermea-
sures, and recovery.
Cryptography. The use of cryptography provides a num-
ber of security properties such confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication that cars lack. However, these mechanisms
are computationally expensive for such systems with limited
capabilities in cars. Thus, the deployment of efficient solutions
is vital. Wolf et al. [161] and Escherich et al. [39] propose
hardware-based solutions that are designed specifically for
cars’ security. Wolf et al. [161] designed and implemented the
Hardware Security Module (HSM). They show its applicability
to secure communications of ECUs within a car, or even
in Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications. Escherich et
al. [39] presented the Secure Hardware Extension (SHE), a
standard for adding security properties, such as secret key
protection and secure boot, to ECUs.
Redefining trust. Koscher et al. [80] suggest two trust-related
controls that would have prevented most, if not all, of their
attacks. Firstly, revoking trust from arbitrary ECUs so they
cannot perform diagnostic and reflashing operations. Secondly,
ECUs with diagnostic and reflashing capabilities must be
authorized and authenticated before performing these tasks.
To do that, trusted platforms, in addition to remote attestation,
need to be deployed [77].
Restricted critical commands. Koscher et al. [80] empha-
sized that legitimate parties require physical access to cars be-
fore issuing any “dangerous” commands. Although this could
be an effective control, the term dangerous is relative, and its
interpretation varies from one manufacturer to another, so that
seemingly-benign commands could result in serious attacks.
If manufacturers decide to restrict the amount of commands
that require physical access, flexibility and convenience will
be affected. Therefore, we need solutions that consider all
possible attacks resulting from critical or benign commands,
while maintaining the existing flexibility.
Bluetooth. Bluetooth connections between devices and cars
can be exploited to launch different attacks such as com-
promising the TCU and consequently other ECUs [18]. Cars
need an additional security layer to defend against Bluetooth-
dependent attacks. Dardanelli et al. [32] show the applicability
of their proposed security layer to protect against smartphone-
initiated Bluetooth attacks, with little impact on performance.
Although their proposal was tested on a two-wheeled vehicle,
it should also be applicable to cars. Furthermore, Woo et
al. [163] proposed a security mechanism to efficiently authen-
ticate connecting devices to smart cars in order to prevent
wireless attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in smartphones.
IDS. Most of the proposed IDS are designed for CAN pro-
tocol, and only a few for other protocols such as FlexRay and
LIN. For example, Larson et al. [85] proposed a specification-
based IDS that is implemented in each ECU, whereas [139]
proposed a behavior-based IDS that supports FlexRay net-
works, besides CAN. In addition, Miller and Valasek [17]
demonstrated a proof-of-concept low-cost attack detection
system that detects anomalies in the CAN network, and the
great opportunities for implementing such a system at low
cost and no manufacturing overhead. Furthermore, Cho and
Shin [25] proposed an anomaly-based IDS that is clock-based
such that it measures and utilizes the intervals of periodic
messages in order to uniquely identify ECUs. The authors call
it “fingerprinting”. Taylor et al. [151] proposed a frequency-
based IDS that detects anomalies between the frequency of
current and historical packets that have strict frequencies.
Physical Attacks Controls. Shoukry et al. [142] proposed a
challenge-response authentication scheme that works at the
physical level. The scheme detects and prevents physical
attacks such as sensors spoofing. The scheme utilizes the
physical properties of signals in the physical/analog domain
by which they were able to implement their scheme. The
scheme detects and prevents the demonstrated attack on the
ABS [141].
C. Cyber-Physical Security Framework
Now after we have surveyed security in the four CPS
applications, we shed light on the relationship between the
CPS and security aspects. In Table VI, we summarize the four
security issues: (1) threats, (2) vulnerabilities, (3) attacks, and
(4) controls with respect to three CPS aspects: (1) cyber, (2)
cyber-physical, and (3) physical for ICS, smart grids, medical
devices, and smart cars. Please note that the table represents
a sample of the surveyed aspects under our framework, and is
by no means comprehensive.
VII. CPS SECURITY CHALLENGES
General CPS Security Challenges
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TABLE VI
CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK. C: CYBER, CP: CYBER-PHYSICAL, AND P: PHYSICAL
CPS Threats Vulnerabilities Attacks Controls
ICS Criminal (C) Internet-connected field devices
(C)
DoS attacks (CP) Close timed out connections (C)
[153]
Criminal (C) COTS TCP/IP stack flaw (C) Malware injection that restores
field devices to default (CP)
TCP/IP supplier fixes the flaw (C)
[153]
Espionage (C) Personnel lack of awareness (C) Dragonfly attack (C) Raise personnel awareness of at-
tack entry points and use proper
antivirus and IDS mechanisms (C)
[150]
Cyberwar (C) Stuxnet: damaged about 1000 cen-
trifuges (CP) [120]
Raise personnel awareness of
the impact using infected
devices/media (CP), regular
software patching (C) and
encryption (C) [27]
Insider (CP) Reliance on security by obscurity
& Lack of access control and non-
repudiation (C)
Maroochy: a ex-insider exploits
knowledge of a systems’ weakness
[143]
Fine-grained access control (C
& CP) and security by design
(C) [147]
Customer (CP) Physical exposure of ICS compo-
nents (P)
Sensors tampering to cause false
reading (CP)
Tamper-resistant field components
(P) [82]
Smart Grid Criminal (C) Internet-connected components of
the grid (C)
Take control and cause blackouts
(CP) [117]
Avoid default and simple pass-
words (C) & Security-in-depth
Hostile nations &
criminals (C)
Aurora vulnerability: power gener-
ators’ breaker
Disruption of circuit breakers to
damage generators
Breakers’ protection measures
[168]
Espionage (C) Unencrypted or inferable
customers’ data (C)
Infer data and reveal customers’
private information, habits, & ap-
pliances (C)
Encryption (C) [92], [167]
Customer (CP) Physical exposure of smart meters
(P)
Physical tampering with smart me-
ters to reduce utility bills [79]
Tamper-resistant meters [26]
Thieves & van-
dals (P)
Unprotected field devices and other
equipments and cables (P)
Stealing or damaging such compo-
nents affects the grid and its cus-
tomers (CP)
Physical protection and improved
resiliency (P) [29]
Medical Devices Criminal (C) Insecure wireless transmission be-
tween programmers and ICDs (C)
Turing off ICDs by retransmitting
”turn off” command (CP)
Zero-power detection & prevention
mechanism (C) [56]
Criminal (C) Insecure wireless communications
between insulin pump, its remote
control, and CGM (C)
FDI (C), command injection (CP),
& replay attacks (CP)
Encrypted communication based
on rolling-code & body-coupled
communication [91]
Espionage (C) Weak or no encryption (C) Revealing patients’ private infor-
mation (C) [56], [92]
Use lightweight encryption (C)
[56] or wearable security devices
(CP) [34], [51], [165]
Politically-
motivated (C)
Wireless control capability (C) Target a political figure by tamper-
ing with ICD configurations (CP)
[134]
Zero power encryption mechanism
(C) [56] or wearable devices (CP)
[34], [51], [165]
Smart Cars Thieves (P) Tampering (P) [64], [162] FDI (C) [64], [80] Hardware-based security measures
[39], [161]
Criminal (C) RKE system (P) Relay signals between car owner’s
key and car (P) [48]
Key shielding (P) and distance-
bounding countermeasures (CP)
[48]
Espionage (C) Wireless links (C) in TPMS [70],
cellular [17], [18], & Bluetooth
[18]
Privacy invasion (C) [18] Secure Bluetooth (C) [32] & trust
redefinition of COTS products (C)
[80]
Criminal (C) Vulnerability in media player’s
parser (C) [18]
DoS and lost of control (CP) [18] Trust redefinition of COTS prod-
ucts (C) [80]
Security by design. Security is not taken into consideration
in the design of most CPS as a result of their isolation in
physically-secured environments without connectivity to other
networks, the Internet for instance. Hence, physical security
has been almost the main security measure [147].
Cyber-physical security. The security mindset of CPS de-
signers needs to change so that they consider both cyber
and physical aspects. This way potential cyber-attacks with
physical consequences will be better predicted and thus mit-
igated [52]. Neuman et al. [118] suggests that when the fun-
damental differences between cyber and physical aspects are
not considered, cyber-physical solutions are usually ignored,
and the focus becomes cyber-only solutions. This urges the
need for considering both cyber- and physical-aspects. Mo et
al. [113] described a new field called “cyber-physical secu-
rity”. The authors’ aim to help by their proposal in developing
novel solutions for the CPS security issues, especially in the
context of smart grids. Furthermore, the survivability of the
systems under attack is very crucial in CPS. A set of CPS
security challenges, such as survivability, are discussed in [12].
The real-timeliness nature. The real-time requirement is a
requirement whose absence affects the security posture [13],
[118]. During a security attack, real-time decisions in CPS
are crucial for systems’ survivability. Therefore, consideration
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of the interactions between physical- and cyber-aspects in any
CPS security design gives the full picture of the system, which
assists in designing better risk-assessment, attack-detection,
and attack-resilient solutions [13]. In addition, cryptographic
mechanisms could cause delays that could affect some real-
time deadlines. Therefore, lightweight and hardware-based
mechanisms should be considered.
Uncoordinated Change. The number of CPS stakeholders
is relatively large. This includes manufacturers, implementors,
operators, administrators and consumers. Their activities and
privileges differ, and hence need to be properly managed [2].
The large number of stakeholders, as well as the heterogeneous
CPS components, require change management. This is another
challenge that we observe to be somewhat ignored. When
changes occur in a group of CPS components, some coordi-
nation is required at some level by the stakeholders. Examples
of such changes are replacing hardware, updating or changing
software, and adding new capabilities [97]. Any uncoordinated
change might alter the initial assumptions about the CPS
security, and therefore could introduce new vulnerabilities.
In addition to the aforementioned general challenges to
CPS security, we highlight some application-specific security
challenges in the following paragraphs.
ICS Challenges
Change management. The ICS environment spans diverse
geographical locations that involve various systems that need
to be replaced, updated, or removed at some point. For
example, in ICS, a system update needs careful planning to
avoid unexpected failure as it has occurred in a nuclear plant
due to an update in a computer in the business network of the
plant [12]. In addition, there is a large number of stakeholders
who can affect the security posture unintentionally. Therefore,
some kind of coordinated change management should be
introduced to prevent and detect security-related changes in
the ICS application [97], [147].
Insider threat. This is probably one of the most difficult
threats to defend against. Insiders could cause security prob-
lems either intentionally or unintentionally. For example, an
insider could leverage the trust given to her/him along with
acquired inside knowledge to launch an attack, such as the
Maroochy water and sewage system, or help remote attackers,
such as Stuxnet propagation via a USB stick. Unintentional
cases where insiders unknowingly use an infected laptop or
USB stick that could give remote attackers access points
to the ICS. The insider threat has been underestimated and
overlooked, and it certainly needs serious considerations [82].
Secure integration. As ICS relies heavily on legacy systems,
it is inherently vulnerable to their vulnerabilities. Therefore,
the integration of new components with legacy systems must
be done securely so that it does not result in new security
vulnerabilities. In addition, due to the large number of legacy
components in ICS, it is economically infeasible to replace
all of them with more secure ones [82]. Meanwhile, their
security should not be ignored and short-term solutions must
be implemented to minimize any potential risks [12].
Smart Grids Challenges
Two-way communication. One of the distinguishing features
of smart grids is the two-way communication, thanks to the ad-
vanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Unlike the power grid,
AMI allows smart meters attached to consumers’ houses, that
are easily accessible by physical attackers, to communicate
with utility companies. This raises a new challenge to secure
these devices [76].
Access control mechanisms. Due to smart grids’ enor-
mous geographical coverage, in addition to the large number
of stakeholders, appropriate access control mechanisms are
needed [2]. Every possible access to smart grids’ network,
data, or devices must be controlled and managed. In addition,
during emergency, access control mechanisms need to have
enough flexibility to give appropriate privileges for the appro-
priate parties.
Privacy concerns. As consumers’ data has become a sig-
nificant part of the smart grids’ traffic, privacy concerns have
become a great challenge. Not only should consumers’ data
be encrypted, but anonymization techniques are also desired
to prevent inference and other attacks from deducing patterns
from the encrypted data to reveal private information [79],
[114]. Some cryptographic-based solutions have been pro-
posed. Li et al. [92] proposed a homomorphic encryption
mechanism to protect consumers privacy while maintaining
low overhead on smart grids’ traffic. However, such an ap-
proach does not prevent an attacker from participating in the
data aggregation as a smart meter by injecting false data
or impersonating a legitimate smart meter [158]. Therefore,
designing mechanisms that both encrypt and aggregate data
securely is a pressing challenge [158].
Explicit trust. Sensed data and sent commands should not
be explicitly trusted. Instead, new mechanisms are needed to
detect false data and unauthorized commands [33]. With the
large size of smart grids, it becomes difficult to detect false
data injection attacks by relying on algorithms that have been
designed to only detect faults [94].
Comprehensive security. Security measures and tools
mainly exist at higher levels in smart grids and their effec-
tiveness decreases towards lower levels. In other words, the
sophistication of security measures decreases in lower levels
due to the limited capabilities in low-level devices. Hence,
security needs to be involved in every part of smart grids,
starting from the lowest levels, i.e., field devices and their
protocols, to high levels, e.g., control centers. Implementing
security at lower levels might have some performance costs.
Therefore, lightweight solutions are desired [78]. The use of
encryption is necessary to provide confidentiality and integrity
at all levels of smart grids. However, the challenge is not in
deploying it, rather, it is in doing it cost-effectively in low
level components.
Change management. Managing changes in smart grids
is no less challenging than it is in ICS. Smart grids are
certainly more diverse and have more stakeholders than ICS
applications, and yet its change management capabilities are
limited [145]. This makes change management an immensely
desired requirement for a more secure smart grids.
Medical Devices Challenges
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Security vs. Usability. Too much security could be result
in counterintuitively result in the inability to reconfigure a
device when a patient is in a critical condition. For example, a
patient with an IMD might be in a situation that needs urgent
intervention by another health care provider. The provider
does not have the cryptographic credentials or the access
privileges that allow him/her to reconfigure the IMD, so the
unavailability of the IMD could be very dangerous [57], [133].
Therefore, designers should strike a balance between usability
and security in medical devices. The usability property should
allow access in emergency situations, for example, while
maintaining security as much as possible. Denning et al. [35]
proposed a promising solution which uses a fail-open/safety
wristband. A patient wears the band to prevent interactions
with unauthorized programmers and other illegitimate parties.
Whenever there is a need to access an IMD, this band is
removed, allowing communication with any programmer. The
authors also propose a number of secure design considerations
for maintaining usability and security in.
Add-on security ≈ increased code. Adding security directly
to the IMDs could increase the size of code and hence the rate
of medical device recalls. In addition, cryptographic operations
could also affect the limited-power at the cost of the original
purpose of a medical device [134]. Thus, it is more desirable
to limit functions of IMDs to pure medical operations and shift
security services to an external device [51].
Limited resources. Extensive computations that are usually
needed in cryptographic mechanisms consume power, which
is a critical resource in these small and limited-resource
devices [57], [133]. The devices must maintain power for a
number of years depending on the nature of the device. For
devices that require surgery to be placed into a patient’s body,
they must be able to function for at least a decade or two.
Halperin et al. [56] proposed one of the first efforts to combine
cryptographic techniques with battery-free consumption. The
authors designed a cryptographic-based solution that relies
solely on RF as a source of energy.
In addition, some attacks might only aim to drain the battery
to disable a device, resulting in a DoS attack [134]. Although
a medical device might refuse to interact with an unauthorized
party sending signals, the very fact that the device receives and
processes the signals from illegitimate parties is problematic
and results in battery depleting. Therefore, new controls should
be developed to prevent such attacks by preventing medical
devices from responding to any illegitimate interaction.
Smart Cars Challenges
Secure integration. Incompatible security assumptions occur
at the boundaries of the integrations when manufacturers inte-
grate COTS and third party components into smart cars. The
lack of the products’ internal details results in this mismatch.
Therefore, manufacturers need to ensure a secure integration
of COTS and third party components. Sagstetter et al. [136]
suggest the adoption of formal methods such as a model-based
design that is combined with verification methods to verify the
correctness of any assumptions about COTS and third party
components. In addition, access control measures need to be
implemented to prevent unauthorized operations, especially
that originate from COTS and third party components [121].
This ensures that the security posture assumed by a car’s
manufacturer is not compromised.
Effective separation. Although gateway ECUs are supposed
to separate CAN network traffic into high and low bandwidths,
various attacks were able to bypass it and gain access to
restricted bandwidths [80]. However, some manufactures ac-
tually have deployed effective separation between critical and
non-critical ECUs by deploying them in completely separate
networks [17]. However, this practice is not that common
among manufacturers. Another promising solution is the use of
Ethernet/IP communications and the replacement of gateway
ECUs by Master-ECUs [136]. One the one hand, this should
provide more bandwidth, so cryptographic solutions can work
without causing communication overhead, and much higher
speeds. On the other hand, it requires manufacturers to replace
the legacy ECUs and network architecture which is a very
costly operation.
Heterogeneity of components. It is difficult to suggest that
all components produced by different Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) should be replaced by components
produced only by car manufacturers. This might be an imprac-
tical solution given the complexity and highly skilled specialty
involved in designing different components that are integrated
with cars. Instead, both parties must be in accord in terms of
security requirements, assessment and testing. Manufacturers
must incorporate security engineers from the early design
phase [77].
In-car communication. The CAN network is inherently vul-
nerable due to the isolation assumption, and thus new protocols
that assume existing potential malicious attackers are needed.
The OVERSEE project [53] aims to design such protocols that
would revolutionize the legacy CAN protocol and replace it
with a highly secure and dependable communication platform.
Other temporary solutions such as firewalls and IDS are also
essential, and could be incorporated into existing cars either as
a part of the gateway ECUs or as stand alone ECUs. A current
project on a stateful IDS that have a contextual awareness of
a current situation [148]. For example, it aims to detect the
legitimacy of messages sent while a car is in a specific status:
parked, driving, and many other contexts.
New vulnerabilities and attacks. In the forthcoming era of
autonomous cars, V2V, and V2I communications, new security
issues are certainly going to arise. Such potential attacks are
discussed in [125].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the paper, we survey the literature on security and
privacy of cyber-physical systems, with a special focus on
four representative CPS applications: ICS, smart grids, medical
devices, and smart cars. We present a taxonomy of threats,
vulnerabilities, known attacks and existing controls. We also
present a cyber-physical security framework that incorporates
CPS aspects into the security aspects. The framework captures
how an attack of the physical domain of a CPS can result
in unexpected consequences in the cyber domain and vice
versa along with proposed solutions. Using our framework,
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effective controls can be developed to eliminate cyber-physical
attacks. For example, we identified that the heterogeneity of
CPS components contributes significantly to many attacks.
Therefore, an effective solution should pay special attention
when heterogeneous components interact.
The research in CPS security is active because of the
frequently reported cyber-attacks. Although some defense
mechanisms have been proposed/deployed, new and system-
specific solutions are still expected in response to the newly
identified threats and vulnerabilities. In this paper, we also
highlight challenges and some missing pieces in CPS security
research, and hope to stimulate more interests in the research
community.
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